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The purpose of this MBA professional report is to introduce the Truth Revealing 
Incentive Mechanism (TRIM) as a tool to help the government obtain more accurate cost 
estimates and control program costs.  The TRIM is an economic mechanism based on 
principal-agent relationships that uses incentives to align contractors’ interests with those 
of the Government.  The TRIM combats principal-agent problems by extracting a 
contractor’s true estimated costs.  The TRIM is structured so that revealing the true 
estimated cost offers the contractor the highest potential fee. 
This report describes the principal-agent theory, identifies principal-agent 
problems in the current contracting environment, discusses how the TRIM addresses 
these problems more effectively than traditional cost-reimbursement contracts, and 
explains how and where the TRIM can be applied.  This report also includes an electronic 
version of the TRIM in Microsoft Excel format, as well as a practitioner’s guide to help 
contracting officers use the TRIM. 
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified weapon system 
acquisition a high-risk area and finds the persistent and long-standing nature of 
acquisition problems has perhaps made a range of key players both in the Pentagon and 
the Congress complacent about cost growth, schedule delays, quantity reductions, and 
performance shortfalls in weapon system programs.1 The government’s inability to 
effectively estimate and control a procurement program’s cost must be resolved. The 
authors contend that principal-agent problems are a driver behind program cost over-runs. 
The purpose of this MBA professional report is to introduce the Truth Revealing 
Incentive Mechanism (TRIM) as a tool to help the government obtain more accurate cost 
estimates and control program costs.  The TRIM is an economic mechanism based on 
principal-agent relationships that uses incentives to align contractors’ interests with those 
of the Government.  The TRIM combats principal-agent problems by extracting a 
contractor’s true estimated costs.  The TRIM is structured so that revealing the true 
estimated cost offers the contractor the highest potential fee. 
Principal-agent problems such as: artificially inflating target costs when market 
forces are absent, buying-in to win a contract award, and intentionally using sub-standard 
workers, the “B-Team,” to execute contracts are strategic behaviors that contractors can 
employ to further their objectives at the Government’s expense.  These problems 
contribute to the cost over-runs that plague so many DoD procurements.  The authors of 
this research paper found value in an economic concept (Gates mechanism) that 
addressed these types of principal agent problems.  The mechanism, although useful in 
theory, did not fit into the boundaries of the DoD contracting environment.  The authors 
endeavored to create a bridge from theory to application by creating the TRIM.  This 
research paper illustrates that journey. 
                                                 
1  U.S. General Accountability Office. (2006). Defense Acquisitions: DOD Wastes Billions of Dollars 
through Poorly Structured Incentives. (GAO-06-409T). Washington D.C. 
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This paper describes the principal-agent theory, identifies principal-agent 
problems in the current contracting environment, discusses how the TRIM addresses 
these problems more effectively than traditional cost-reimbursement contracts, and 
explains how and where the TRIM can be applied.  This report also includes an electronic 
version of the TRIM in Microsoft Excel format, as well as a practitioner’s guide to help 




In Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions, the Government’s objectives are to 
procure capabilities better, faster, and cheaper.  Defense contractors’ objectives are to 
maximize profit while fulfilling the Government’s objectives. Consequently, the DoD 
often enters into contracts with a misalignment of objectives that result in increased costs.  
Contractors have opportunities to engage in strategic behavior for the purpose of 
furthering their own interests at the expense of the Government, thus problems may arise. 
Wouldn’t it be nice if the DoD had a contracting tool that aligns contractor and 
Government objectives and reveals a contractor’s true cost before entering into a 
contract?  Better yet, wouldn’t it be great if the contractor voluntarily shared this true cost 
information with the Government? 
This MBA professional report introduces the Truth Revealing Incentive 
Mechanism (TRIM) and explains how the TRIM can be used to control program costs by 
revealing: contractor’s true cost and program budget shortfalls. 
The cost reimbursement contract environment allows contractors to easily further 
their interests (profit) at the Government’s expense by misrepresenting their true costs. 
For example, a contractor may propose a target cost lower than their true cost to increase 
the probability of winning the contract, a practice known as “buying-in.” Another 
example of strategic behavior is when a contractor, in the absence of competition or 
market forces, proposes a target cost much higher than their true cost to receive a higher 
target fee. 
One key to program success lies in the ability to reveal a contractor’s true cost 
and align DoD and contractor objectives.  How do we align both DoD and contractor 
objectives and make sure that contractors reveal their true-costs?  We recognize two 
approaches—external and internal controls.  The typical DoD approach focuses on 
external controls exemplified in the form of rules, regulations and additional oversight.  
Unfortunately, external controls are usually very costly, resource intensive, and often 
ineffective.  In contrast, internal controls are a more cost effective way to ensure 
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contractors act in the Government’s best interest.  Internal controls are contract incentives 
such as share ratios, award fees, and award terms that reward contractors for working 
towards Government objectives. 
Kenneth Oscar, former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology [ASA][ALT], wisely stated “Our [the Government’s] goal is 
to get the best product or service for the price, the contractor’s goal is to give us the best 
product or service while reducing risk and increasing profit.  The key to a good contract 
is to structure it in such a way to align our goals with the contractor’s goals.2  The TRIM 
is an economic mechanism based on principal-agent relationships that uses incentives to 
align contractors’ interests with those of the Government.  The mechanism is named 
“truth revealing” because it incentivizes the contractor to pick the contract that most 
closely reflects their expected cost.  In other words, the incentive structure should ensure 
that the contractor maximizes expected profits by choosing a low cost target if expected 
costs are low, and by choosing a high cost target if expected costs are high.3   With most 
major acquisition programs reporting cost over-runs, the DoD could benefit from using 
the TRIM to extract true expected cost information from contractors. Knowing a 
contractor’s true expected cost helps the Government identify budget concerns. 
The second chapter explains the economic concept of principal-agent 
relationships and the resulting problems encountered, such as asymmetric information, 
moral hazard, and adverse selection.  This section gives the reader a background 
understanding of the economic principles and theories used in deriving the TRIM. 
The third chapter explains how principal-agent problems enable contractors to 
engage in strategic behavior to further their own personal objectives at the expense of the 
Government.  There are many situational factors surrounding DoD’s contracting 
environment, especially in cost reimbursement contracts, that make principal-agent 
problems very attractive to contractors (i.e. easy for the contractor to act in their own best 
                                                 
2 RAND Arroyo Center, RAND Corporation. (2005). Reexamining Military Acquisition reform: Are 
we there yet? Retrieved September 20, 2007, from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG291.pdf. 
3 W. R. Gates. (1987).  Incentive Contracting and the Design of Regulatory Mechanisms: Theory is 
Nice but Can it be Applied? (Economic Research Series No.29). Pasadena: Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 
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interest, at the expense of the Government, while maintaining the veneer that they are 
acting in the Government’s best interest).  This chapter will investigate areas in the 
current DoD cost reimbursement contracting environment that are highly susceptible to 
principal-agent relationship problems. 
The fourth chapter introduces the TRIM, explains how the mechanism works, and 
how the TRIM rectifies DoD-specific principal-agent problems discussed in the previous 
chapter.  This chapter also highlights benefits of the TRIM that extend beyond principal-
agent concepts. 
The fifth chapter explains where the TRIM can be best applied to the DoD 
contract environment.  This chapter will explain how the original mechanism was 
modified to fit within the constraints of the Federal Acquisition Regulations and lessons 
learned about the mechanism’s behavior from repeated simulations.  This chapter will 
also cover limitations of the mechanism found while testing the mechanism. 
The sixth, and final, chapter of this professional report will discuss areas for 
further research. 
Included as an appendix to the professional report is a practitioner’s guide 
providing contracting officers step-by-step instructions on how to set-up and execute the 
TRIM in preparation for contract negotiations and subsequent contract administration. 
This report gives readers the knowledge needed to implement the TRIM, but 
before contract professionals can use the TRIM to combat principal-agent problems, they 
must first understand the problems associated with principal-agent relationships.  The 
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II. PRINCIPAL AGENT RELATIONSHIPS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The TRIM mechanism is based on an economic field of study called agency 
theory, also known as principal-agent relationships.  This chapter gives a general history 
of the theory, defines major concepts, and gives examples of each concept. 
B. PRINCIPAL-AGENT HISTORY 
The study of principal-agent relationships started in the late 1960s when 
economists explored how cooperating parties dealt with their different attitudes towards 
risks.  The theory expanded to included principal-agent problems that occur when 
cooperating parties have different goals.4  The principal-agent relationship framework is 
used to define problems in many areas of study such as: economics, finance, corporate 
governance, insurance, politics, strategy, and organizational behavior. 
C. PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
A principal-agent relationship is formed when one party is delegated work to 
perform for the benefit of the other party.  Principal-agent theory is derived from the 
trade-off between (a) the cost of measuring behavior and (b) the cost of measuring 
outcomes and transferring risk to the agent.5 
1. Principal 
The principal is an individual or organization that employs another individual or 
organization to work on its behalf to achieve an objective(s).  For example, if a 
homeowner hires a landscaper to cut his lawn, the homeowner is the principal. 
                                                 
4 K. M. Eisenhardt. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of Management 
Review, 14, 57-74. Retrieved October 10,2007 from EBSCOhost database. 
5 Eisenhardt, 58. 
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2. Agent 
The agent is an individual or organization that acts on the principal’s behalf and is 
supposed to advance the principal’s interests.6  For example, if a homeowner hires a 
landscaper to cut his lawn, the landscaper is the agent. 
D. PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP PROBLEMS 
Motivating one person or organization to act on behalf of another is known 
among economists as the “principal-agent problem”.7  The principal employs the agent to 
work towards the principal’s best interest.  Conversely, there is a tendency for an agent to 
work towards their own best interest.  Problems arise when the principal and agent’s 
interests are misaligned.  BIth parties often have incomplete information and it is usually 
costly or difficult for the principal to perfectly monitor whether or not the agent is acting 
in the principal’s interest.  As a result, agents can engage in strategic behaviors that 
further their own best interests at the expense of the principal’s best interests.8 
Principal-agent problems and issues discussed in this chapter are information 
asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and risk aversion. 
1. Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry occurs in principal-agent relationships when relevant 
information (perhaps about incentives, effort, or plans) is known and privately held by 
only the agent.9  This private information gives advantage to the agent in principal-agent 
negotiations and affords the agent pre-contractual opportunism.  For example, a landlord 
living in a state different from that of his rental property contracts with a lawn service to 
keep the grounds looking nice.  The amount of effort and cost of the effort performed by 
                                                 
6 P. Milgrom, & J. Roberts. (1992). Economics, Organization & Management. New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall. 
7 Milgrom, 214. 
8 Gates, 2. 
9 Milgrom, 140. 
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the lawn service is unknown and unobservable by the principal.  The landlord only knows 
he pays the invoice for the service performed. 
2. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is post-contract opportunism allowing the agent to use information 
asymmetry to take hidden actions that furthers the agent’s best interest at the expense of 
the principal.  Moral hazard arises when the principal is unable to simply force the agent 
to act according to his interests.10  For example, a contractor has two ongoing cost-
reimbursement contracts.  One contract rewards cost control with additional fee and the 
other provides a fixed fee with no incentive for cost control.  The contractor can put its 
stronger engineers against the cost-control contract and its weaker engineers against the 
fixed-fee contract, so that the contract structure encourages the contractor to take actions 
that are in the agent’s but not the principal’s best interest. 
3. Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection occurs when the selection process has the unintended 
consequence of encouraging outcomes that the principal considers unfavorable. 11 
Adverse selection originates from the inability of the principal to verify information 
provided by the agent and becomes evident post contract award.  For example, employees 
at a business may choose from two options given through their healthcare plan, one 
option is a low-cost standard benefit plan; the other is a high-cost comprehensive benefit 
plan.  Adverse selection occurs because the sickest employees will choose the high-cost 





                                                 
10 Gates, 2. 
11 Gates, 3. 
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4. Signaling 
Signaling occurs when a principal uses an agent’s observable behaviors to 
uncover an agent’s private information.  For example, during a job interview, the agent 
includes scholastic achievements in their resume signaling to their prospective employer 
their intelligence and diligence. 
5. Risk Aversion 
Risk aversion occurs when individuals would rather have a smaller income that is 
certain as opposed to an uncertain income that is larger on average but is subject to 
unpredictable and uncontrollable variability.12  For example, a risk-averse employee 
might prefer to be guaranteed $60 for their effort rather than take the chance of earning 
an uncertain income with an average of $75, where there was the possibility of earning 
$100 for optimum performance and $50 for poor performance. 
Now that the foundation has been laid by explaining principal-agent relationships 
and concepts, Chapter III will describe where principal-agent problems are found in the 
DoD contracting environment. 
                                                 
12 Milgrom, 187. 
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III. PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS IN THE DOD 
CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT 
Principal-agent problems exist in most contractual relationships due to differing 
objectives held by the principal and agent.  This chapter identifies principal-agent 
problems in DoD’s contracting environment and explains how these problems enable 
contractors to engage in strategic behavior to further their objectives at the Government’s 
expense. 
There are many situational factors surrounding DoD’s contracting environment, 
both with and without competitive market forces, which make principal-agent problems 
exploitable for contractors to the detriment of the Government.  Because principal-agent 
relationship problems are most easily exploited when using cost reimbursement contracts, 
this paper focuses on problems with respect to cost reimbursement contracts.  To 
understand how principal-agent problems occur in cost reimbursement contracts, it is 
important to understand the fundamentals of such contracts. 
A. COST REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTS 
The Government uses cost reimbursement contracts when there is a high level of 
uncertainty and the contractor is unwilling to assume risk under a fixed price contract.  In 
a cost reimbursement contract, the Government accepts the cost and performance risk by 
reimbursing the contractor for all allowable costs incurred in performing the contract. 
The contractor signs up to give their “best effort” in achieving contract requirements 
within the maximum contract price.  A best effort can equate to exhausting all contract 
funds, yet falling short of meeting contract requirements. 
B. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
Information asymmetry is differences among individuals in their information13 
or, in the context of contracting, one party having information not known to the other.  A 
                                                 
13 Milgrom, 600. 
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party’s decision to truthfully reveal this information is solely optional.  This asymmetry 
provides the party holding private information leverage in dealings with the other party 
and affords opportunities to further their objectives. 
Information asymmetry in Government contracting usually means the agent 
(contractor) has privately held information on company costs that the principal 
(Government) cannot obtain.  Contractors have incentives to keep this information 
private to maintain leverage in negotiations with the principal as well as affording 
opportunities to buy-in and win contracts, unbeknownst to the Government. 
1. Disadvantaged Negotiating Position 
The fact there is asymmetrical information places the Government in a 
disadvantaged position for negotiations.  The Government determines “should” costs for 
a program.  Should costs are a reasonable estimate of how much the procurement will 
cost. Should cost is determined by gathering internal and independent estimates of cost 
and historical information on procurements similar in size and complexity.  Similarly, the 
contractor estimates “should” costs, but also possesses the ability to more accurately 
estimate “could” costs.  Could cost is a contractor’s best estimation of cost considering 
available resources, their efficiency, and their application to the procurement.  A 
contractor’s “could cost” can be either higher or lower than the Government’s should 
cost.  Only the contractor knows if the cost proposed is efficient given their resources.  
The current Government practice to counter this asymmetric information position relies 
on Government subject matter experts to evaluate the contractor’s proposed tasks for 
reasonableness, both in effort and cost.  While the Government evaluates reasonableness, 
without knowing the contractor’s information, the Government is unable to evaluate 
whether the cost is efficient given the resources.  The contractor’s proposed cost and the 




Buying-in occurs for many reasons.  One of which is the contractor heavily 
desires to win the contract.  The Government awards contracts based on the best value or 
lowest price technically acceptable to the Government.  Both approaches use price as a 
heavily weighted factor in evaluating to whom the contract will be awarded.  This entices 
a contractor to propose a price lower than their known cost/cost information suggests. 
Buying in may occur because the contractor knows the work to be performed is 
more costly than the figure they propose but are forced to buy-in due to the restriction of 
the Government’s budget.  The contract will not be awarded unless the cost is within the 
Government’s budget.  The Government’s budget constraint forces all contractors to 
propose a cost they know will be exceeded. 
Contractors can propose a price lower than their true cost with the intent of 
increasing their chances of winning a contract, with the hope of later recouping these 
costs through contract modifications/renegotiation or follow-on work.  How does the 
Government know this is happening?  It is not totally evident to the Government the 
contractor is attempting to buy-in and many times the result can be cost overruns and 
program volatility. 
Other reasons buying-in occurs may be the desire to prevent award to 
competitors, entering a desirable market to gain experience, keeping their workforce 
intact, or “getting their foot in the door” by winning this award and hoping it will lead to 
similar follow-on type work.  Without the knowledge of contractor buy-in, the 
Government is surely to overrun their budget. 
The imbalance of information results because the contractor is privy to their own 
company cost structure and resources and better estimates costs than the Government.  
True cost, and if the contractor bought-in, will only be known when the project is 
complete and all allowable, incurred contractor costs including any fee have been paid. 
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3. Sole Source Environment 
Occasionally the Government has a requirement that can only be met by a sole 
source and this gives the source leverage over the Government.  Adding to this leverage 
is the fact that contractors can easily find Government program financial information.  
The Government’s mandated process of financial transparency provides the public, and 
thus the contractor, information concerning the Government’s congressionally 
appropriated program costs (budget). 
The agent, armed with budget information, has no incentive to propose a price 
lower than the budget even if their estimated true cost is below the Government’s budget.  
The contractor is incentivized to propose a price equal to the budget.  The contractor can 
include inefficiencies in their proposal, such as allowing for less efficient workers in their 
proposal and having more efficient workers actually perform the work. 
C. MORAL HAZARD 
Moral hazard was defined previously as post-contract opportunism allowing the 
agent to use information asymmetry to take hidden actions that further the agent’s 
objectives at the principal’s expense. 
The Government’s approach to the problem of moral hazard, and countering any 
hidden action, is one of buying adherence to Government interests through oversight and 
insight.  To align interests and prevent moral hazard, the Government buys a level of 
insight into contractor performance using financial and program reports and oversight by 
program office managers assigned responsibility for the requirement.  This approach is 
costly and relatively ineffective because it only provides the Government a retrospective 
view of costs incurred. 
An incentive contract with appropriately outlined incentives may help control 
moral hazard.  Incentive contracts align interests through rewarding the contractor when 




conditions warrant use of a cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract, there may be greater 
contractor focus on satisfying the Government’s subjective award fee criteria than 
aligning interests. 
Post-contract opportunism has been easily exploited when using CPAF contracts.  
CPAF contracts are chosen when objective incentive targets are not easily defined; 
therefore, a subjective evaluation of predetermined criteria is used to motivate the 
contractor.  The purpose for using CPAF contracts has been lost as the DoD has paid high 
award fees regardless of contractor performance. 
A recent Government Accountability Office report stated: 
DoD practices—such as routinely paying its contractors nearly all of the 
available award fee, amounting to billions of dollars, regardless of whether 
the acquisition outcomes fell short of, met, or exceeded expectations; 
rolling an estimated $669 million in unearned or withheld award fees to 
future evaluation periods; and paying a significant portion of the available 
fee for what award-fee plans describe as “acceptable, average, expected, 
good, or satisfactory” performance—all lessen the motivation for the 
contractor to strive for excellent performance.14 
The trend of paying consistently high award fees can be alternatively seen as a 
cost reimbursement contract paying a fixed fee.  Cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts 
pay a negotiated fixed amount without regard to program costs.  Similarly, there is no 
incentive to control costs in a CPAF contract if the contractor receives approximately the 
same fee regardless of performance.  Figure 1 shows a sample of programs grossly over 
budget and their respective award-fee payouts.  Figure 2 shows the consistency with 
which these high levels have been paid. 
                                                 
14 U.S. General Accountability Office. (2007). Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions In 
Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes. (GAO-06-66). Washington D.C. 
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Source: From GAO Report (06-066) 
 





Source: From GAO Report (06-066) 
Figure 2.   Percentage of Available Award Fee Earned for 572 Evaluation Periods in 
GAO’s Sample. 
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D. ADVERSE SELECTION 
Adverse selection originates from the principal’s inability to verify the 
information provided by the agent.  Because the Government does not have information 
regarding all of a contractor’s resources, verifying information is impossible.  The true 
problem with adverse selection is that adverse selection occurs pre-contract award but 
becomes evident post-contract award.  Often, the Government can not prevent adverse 
selection from occurring nor does a tool exist that signals when it may occur.  The 
inability to avoid contracting with a less efficient firm increases cost. 
The Government does their best to reduce principal-agent problems such as 
information asymmetry, moral hazard, and adverse selection.  The TRIM mechanism was 
specifically designed to address principal-agent problems.  Although the TRIM does not 
completely eliminate principal-agent problems, it can provide protection against these 
problems where the traditional contract mechanisms fall short.  The next chapter 
introduces the TRIM, compares it to traditional cost-reimbursement contracts, and 
explains how the TRIM reduces principal-agent problems better than traditional 
contracts. 
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IV. USING THE TRIM TO COMBAT PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
PROBLEMS 
A. WHAT IS THE TRIM? 
The TRIM is an economic mechanism based on principal-agent relationships that 
uses monetary incentives to align a contractor’s interests with those of the Government.  
The TRIM was derived from a negotiation mechanism described in a research paper by 
NPS Associate Professor William Gates titled “Incentive Contracting and the Design of 
Regulatory Mechanisms: Theory is nice but can it be applied?”15  The negotiation 
mechanism was developed for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s use when negotiating the 
purchase of satellite subsystems from NASA contractors on a cost reimbursement basis.  
Gates’ negotiation mechanism was further modified to include Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) policy guidelines, leading to the mechanism that this report names 
“TRIM.” 
B. STRUCTURE OF THE TRIM 
The mechanism is called “truth revealing” because it structures incentives in such 
a way that contractors are incentivized to select the contract option that most closely 
reflects their expected cost.  In other words, the incentive structure ensures the contractor 
maximizes expected fees by choosing a low cost target if expected costs are low, and by 
choosing a high cost target if expected costs are high. 
Simply put, the TRIM generates a variety of contract options from which a 
contractor can choose.  The options provided by the TRIM read like a restaurant menu.  
Each option on the menu has three components listed in the columns: target cost, share 
ratio, and target fee.  Each row on the menu is a contract option available to the 
contractor.  Each row is a packaged deal—the contractor can not select a target cost from  
 
                                                 
15  Gates, 6. 
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one row and a share ratio or target fee from another.  Figure 3 is an example of a contract 
menu established by TRIM.  The highlighted row signifies one of the many options 
available. 
 
4,050,000$         0.600 759,375$     
4,114,286$         0.568 721,837$     
4,178,571$         0.536 686,365$     
4,242,857$         0.504 652,959$     
4,307,143$         0.471 621,620$     
4,371,429$         0.439 592,347$     
4,435,714$         0.407 565,140$     
4,500,000$         0.375 540,000$     
4,564,286$         0.343 516,926$     
4,628,571$         0.311 495,918$     
4,692,857$         0.279 476,977$     
4,757,143$         0.246 460,102$     
4,821,429$         0.214 445,293$     
4,885,714$         0.182 432,551$     
4,950,000$         0.150 421,875$     
Share Ratio
Contract Menu
Target Cost Target Fee
 
 
Figure 3.   TRIM-based Contract Menu 
 
C. HOW DOES TRIM WORK? 
Incentives are structured so the contractor has the potential to earn the highest fee 
if they choose the contract closest to their expected costs.  The target fee function is 
structured so contractors have the potential to receive higher fee if they choose a lower 
target cost.  The share ratio is structured so that a contractor’s risk increases as the target 
fee increases (target cost decreases). 
The mathematical relationship between the target fees, target costs, and share 
ratio make the fee lost by over-running the target cost greater than the fee gained by 
selecting a lower target cost.  Reciprocally, the fee gained by under-running the target 
cost is less than the potential fee gained by selecting a lower target cost.  The relationship 
between target cost, share ratio, and target fee make the TRIM truth revealing. 
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The chosen target fee is divided into two pools: incentive and award fee.  The 
incentive fee uses an objective formula based on how well the contractor’s target cost 
equates to actual costs.  The award fee is a subjective incentive the contractor may earn in 
entirety or in part during contract performance.  The award fee portion is intended to 
incentivize the contractor in performance areas outside of cost, such as: quality, schedule, 
and technical performance. 
In order for the TRIM to create truth revealing incentives, the incentive and award 
fee pools must be interconnected.  When using the TRIM, contracts are structured so any 
cost over-run is first deducted from the incentive fee portion of the target fee.  If the cost 
over-run is so large that it eliminates the entire cost incentive fee, the overrun penalty is 
taken from the award fee pool.  Simply put, the contractor’s share of a cost over-run can 
reduce both the cost incentive pool and award fee pool. 
The details of how to construct the TRIM contract menu, negotiate using the 
TRIM, and administer the contract using the TRIM are explained in the user’s guide 
provided as an appendix to this report. 
D. HOW TRIM REDUCES PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS 
The TRIM was specifically designed to address principal-agent problems the 
Government was vulnerable to under traditional cost-reimbursement contract 
mechanisms.  In this section, a TRIM-based contract is compared against traditional cost-
reimbursement contracts to explain how a TRIM-based contract reduces principal agent 
problems.  The TRIM-based contract is compared against three of the most common cost-
reimbursement contracts: CPFF, CPAF, and cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF).  Below, 
traditional cost reimbursement contracts are defined. 
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1. Traditional Cost Reimbursement Contracts 
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF): a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for 
payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception of the contract.  
The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost.”16 
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF): a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for 
a fee consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at inception of the 
contract and (b) an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by the 
Government, sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance.”17 
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF): a cost-reimbursement contract that provides 
for an initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the relationship 
of total allowable costs to total target costs.”18 
2. Combating the Incentive to Raise Target Costs 
In CPFF, CPAF, and CPIF contracts, the target fee is customarily based on a 
percentage of target cost.  It is in the contractor’s best interest to negotiate a target cost as 
high as possible because increasing the target cost equates to an increase in potential fees.  
Information asymmetry places the Government in a disadvantaged negotiating position 
when trying to uncover these strategic cost increases.  Since the Government does not 
have access to a contractor’s private information, it is hard for the Government to 
determine if a contractor’s proposed cost is legitimate.  The typical DoD approach to 
uncover private information has focused on external measures represented in the form of 
purchasing contractor cost information and using Government subject experts to 
thoroughly evaluate proposals for excessive costs.  Unfortunately, external controls are 
usually costly and resource intensive.  The alternative approach, internal controls, 
involves using contract incentives to encourage the contractor to act in the DoD’s interest 
by rewarding the contractor with higher profits for revealing true costs.  The following 
                                                 
16  Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Current through FAC 2005-21, November 2007. 
17  Federal Acquisition Regulations. 
18  Federal Acquisition Regulations. 
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example explains how traditional contract mechanisms encourage contractors to inflate 
costs during negotiations, while the TRIM incentivizes contractors to lower their target 
costs, if their expected costs are lower. 
For example, the Air Force is negotiating with a traditional contract vehicle 
(CPFF, CPAF, or CPIF) to build state-of-the-art video sensors for the Predator 
Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV).  The contractor estimates the development work will 
cost $12M and believes they will negotiate a reasonable target fee of 10%.  Figure 4, 
shows how contractors are incentivized to propose higher target costs when negotiating a 
traditional cost-reimbursement contract.  Column A represents the possible target costs 
the contractor can propose to the Government for developing the sensors.  Column B 
represents the target fee the contractors would receive if the fee is based on a negotiated 
percentage of target cost (10%).  Column C represents the total contract price and is the 
sum of column A and B.  The green highlighted row represents the contractor’s estimated 
true costs. As the diagram indicates, a traditional cost reimbursement contract 




10,800,000$      1,080,000$                  11,880,000$         
10,971,429$      1,097,143$                  12,068,571$         
11,142,857$      1,114,286$                  12,257,143$         
11,314,286$      1,131,429$                  12,445,714$         
11,485,714$      1,148,571$                  12,634,286$         
11,657,143$      1,165,714$                  12,822,857$         
11,828,571$      1,182,857$                  13,011,429$         
12,000,000$      1,200,000$                  13,200,000$         * Expected Costs
12,171,429$      1,217,143$                  13,388,571$         
12,342,857$      1,234,286$                  13,577,143$         
12,514,286$      1,251,429$                  13,765,714$         
12,685,714$      1,268,571$                  13,954,286$         
12,857,143$      1,285,714$                  14,142,857$         
13,028,571$      1,302,857$                  14,331,429$         
13,200,000$      1,320,000$                  14,520,000$        
Target Fee Increases as Target Cost Increases-                               
Target Cost
Target Fee             
(10% of Target Cost)
 
Figure 4.   Cost-Reimbursement Opportunism for Contractors (Raising Target Costs) 
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A contract negotiated using the TRIM is not vulnerable to the same pre-
contractual opportunism.  When using the TRIM, target costs and target profits are 
inversely related so a contractor is not incentivized to overstate their proposed target 
costs. 
For example, the Air Force is using the TRIM in negotiating with a sole-source to 
build state-of-the-art video sensors for the Predator Unmanned Arial Vehicle.  The 
contractor estimates the development work will cost $12M and believes they will 
negotiate a reasonable fee of 10%.  Due to the TRIM incentive structure, the contractor 
has no incentive to inflate cost.  Figure 5, shows how a TRIM-based contract defends 
against contract opportunism. 
 
Target Fee Increases as Target Costs Decrease
A B C D
10,800,000$       0.400 1,620,000$   12,420,000$  
10,971,429$       0.386 1,552,653$   12,524,082$  
11,142,857$       0.371 1,487,755$   12,630,612$  
11,314,286$       0.357 1,425,306$   12,739,592$  
11,485,714$       0.343 1,365,306$   12,851,020$  
11,657,143$       0.329 1,307,755$   12,964,898$  
11,828,571$       0.314 1,252,653$   13,081,224$  
12,000,000$       0.300 1,200,000$   13,200,000$  * Expected Costs
12,171,429$       0.286 1,149,796$   13,321,224$  
12,342,857$       0.271 1,102,041$   13,444,898$  
12,514,286$       0.257 1,056,735$   13,571,020$  
12,685,714$       0.243 1,013,878$   13,699,592$  
12,857,143$       0.229 973,469$      13,830,612$  
13,028,571$       0.214 935,510$      13,964,082$  
13,200,000$       0.200 900,000$      14,100,000$ 
Target Cost Target Fee Cost TotalShare Ratio
 
Figure 5.   TRIM-Based Contract that Defends Against Contractor Opportunism (Raising 
Target Costs) 
Column A represents the possible target costs the contractor can select for 
developing the sensors.  Column B represents the contractor share ratio.  Column C 
represents the potential target fee a contractor can earn, based on the target cost in the 
same row.  Column D represents the total contract price and is the sum of column A and 
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C.  The green highlighted row represents the contractor’s estimated true cost.  As the 
diagram indicates, the TRIM-based contract does not incentivize the contractor to 
propose a target cost higher than their estimated cost.  The figure even seems to suggest 
that the TRIM-based contract incentivizes contractors to propose a target cost lower than 
their expected cost.  However, the share ratio keeps the contractor from proposing a 
target cost lower than their expected cost.  The share ratio and target fee increase 
proportionately so that a contractor assumes more risk if they attempt to earn a larger 
profit pool.  Figure 6 is a payout table that shows how the TRIM incentivizes a contractor 
to propose a target cost that is the same as their expected contract cost.  Payout tables of 
traditional cost reimbursement contracts are illustrated later in this chapter. 
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Actual Cost
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Target Cost 11,142,857$  11,314,286$  11,485,714$  11,657,143$ 11,828,571$ 12,000,000$ 12,171,429$ 12,342,857$ 12,514,286$ 12,685,714$ 12,857,143$ 13,028,571$    
1 11,142,857$  1,487,755$    1,424,082$    1,360,408$    1,296,735$    1,233,061$    1,169,388$    1,105,714$    1,042,041$    978,367$       914,694$       851,020$       787,347$          
2 11,314,286$  1,486,531$    1,425,306$    1,364,082$    1,302,857$    1,241,633$    1,180,408$    1,119,184$    1,057,959$    996,735$       935,510$       874,286$       813,061$          
3 11,485,714$  1,482,857$    1,424,082$    1,365,306$    1,306,531$    1,247,755$    1,188,980$    1,130,204$    1,071,429$    1,012,653$    953,878$       895,102$       836,327$          
4 11,657,143$  1,476,735$    1,420,408$    1,364,082$    1,307,755$    1,251,429$    1,195,102$    1,138,776$    1,082,449$    1,026,122$    969,796$       913,469$       857,143$          
5 11,828,571$  1,468,163$    1,414,286$    1,360,408$    1,306,531$    1,252,653$    1,198,776$    1,144,898$    1,091,020$    1,037,143$    983,265$       929,388$       875,510$          
6 12,000,000$  1,457,143$    1,405,714$    1,354,286$    1,302,857$    1,251,429$    1,200,000$    1,148,571$    1,097,143$    1,045,714$    994,286$       942,857$       891,429$          
7 12,171,429$  1,443,673$    1,394,694$    1,345,714$    1,296,735$    1,247,755$    1,198,776$    1,149,796$    1,100,816$    1,051,837$    1,002,857$    953,878$       904,898$          
8 12,342,857$  1,427,755$    1,381,224$    1,334,694$    1,288,163$    1,241,633$    1,195,102$    1,148,571$    1,102,041$    1,055,510$    1,008,980$    962,449$       915,918$          
9 12,514,286$  1,409,388$    1,365,306$    1,321,224$    1,277,143$    1,233,061$    1,188,980$    1,144,898$    1,100,816$    1,056,735$    1,012,653$    968,571$       924,490$          
10 12,685,714$  1,388,571$    1,346,939$    1,305,306$    1,263,673$    1,222,041$    1,180,408$    1,138,776$    1,097,143$    1,055,510$    1,013,878$    972,245$       930,612$          
11 12,857,143$  1,365,306$    1,326,122$    1,286,939$    1,247,755$    1,208,571$    1,169,388$    1,130,204$    1,091,020$    1,051,837$    1,012,653$    973,469$       934,286$          
12 13,028,571$  1,339,592$    1,302,857$    1,266,122$    1,229,388$    1,192,653$    1,155,918$    1,119,184$    1,082,449$    1,045,714$    1,008,980$    972,245$       935,510$          







Figure 6.   TRIM  Fee-Payout Table
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In Figure 6, the letters (A-M) represent the columns and the numbers (1-12) 
represent the rows.  The letters and numbers will be used to identify specific cells in 
explaining this figure.  The blue colored column (column A) represents possible target 
costs a contractor can choose.  The green colored row (top row) represents the actual cost 
of the contract.  The yellow and orange cells represent potential fees.  The orange shaded 
cells represent the highest potential fee a contractor can receive for a given actual cost.  
As shown in the figure above, if a contractor expects actual costs to be $12M (Column 
G), the highest fee a contractor can earn is if the contractor chooses a target cost of $12M 
(Cell G6).  There is no incentive for the contractor to propose any target cost other than 
what the contractor believes to be their true cost.  Yet, there is still an incentive for the 
contractor to perform as efficiently as possible and reduce actual costs (fees increase as 
you move left across the rows). 
3. Reducing the Incentive to Buy-In 
As identified in Chapter III, buying in occurs in the competitive environment.  In 
its current state, the TRIM is not truth revealing in a competitive environment although it 
does reduce the incentive to buy-in in some instances. 
There are two types of buy-in.  The first is when a firm proposes a low price 
because it is willing to lose money on a particular contract, either for competitive reasons 
or with the intent of earning back the money with profits from follow-on contracts.  The 
second is when a firm is NOT willing to lose money on a particular contract, but 
proposes a low price with the intent of either obtaining a contract that does not punish 
cost overruns (poorly administered CPAF, or CPFF) or somehow renegotiating the 
contract later to ensure that the contract is profitable. 
The first type of buy-in is not addressed by the current TRIM.  The TRIM is not 
structured to address buy-in if a contractor is willing to lose fee for the opportunity of 
preventing award to competitors, entering a desirable market to gain experience, keeping 
their workforce intact, or getting follow-on work. 
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The second type of buy-in can be addressed when using the TRIM.  The TRIM 
may not reveal a contractor’s true cost but does discourage buy-in because the contractor 
shares the cost of any overrun.  For example, CPFF contracts are at the greatest risk for 
buying–in because there are no post-award incentives to keep the contractor from 
overrunning the target cost.  Since fees are fixed regardless of contract performance, a 
contractor can propose a target cost lower than their expected costs to undercut the 
competition and win the contract.  In this case, the Government would adversely select a 
contractor under the pretense they will be able to fulfill the contract at a proposed target 
cost that was less expensive than the competition.  The contractor would begin work 
knowing they would eventually overrun their target cost.  The contractor would not be 
incentivized to take any corrective measures to minimize a cost over-run because the fee 
is fixed regardless of how close the relationship of actual cost to target cost. 
CPAF contracts often fall prey to the same buying-in risks found in CPFF 
contracts.  Although CPAF and CPFF contracts have different structures and rules, they 
display very similar characteristics in practice.  In recent years, CPAF contracts have 
closely mirrored CPFF contracts, due to DoD’s culpability in paying contractors the 
majority of award fees regardless of performance.  According to a December 2005 GAO 
report entitled “DoD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of 
Acquisition Outcomes,” the GAO’s sample of 63 award fee contracts revealed the 
median percentage of fee awarded was 93 percent. 19  Paying award fee regardless of 
performance provides the same incentive as CPFF contracts.  As a result, contractors can 
essentially employ the same strategic tactics they use on CPFF—strategically buying-in 
on a contract knowing that they will not be penalized for poor performance. 
Figure 7, is a payout table that shows how contractors are incentivized to buy in 
on a CPFF contract or a poorly administered CPAF contract.  As shown in the figure 
below, performance doesn’t matter as the contractor will always earn the fixed fee.  For 
example, a contractor can buy-in by proposing a target cost of $12M (Row 7) even 
though the contractor expects the effort to actually cost $13M (Column M), their fee will 
                                                 
19 Government Accountability Office. 
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always be $1.2M (Row 7), no matter how much they overrun the target cost.  Figure 7 
also shows that regardless of contract performance, it is in the contractor’s best interest to 
propose the highest possible target cost (Row 12, highlighted in orange). 
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A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Actual Cost
1 Target Cost 11,142,857$    11,314,286$    11,485,714$    11,657,143$   11,828,571$   12,000,000$   12,171,429$   12,342,857$   12,514,286$   12,685,714$   12,857,143$   13,028,571$   
2 11,142,857$    1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      1,114,286$      
3 11,314,286$    1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      1,131,429$      
4 11,485,714$    1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      1,148,571$      
5 11,657,143$    1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      1,165,714$      
6 11,828,571$    1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      1,182,857$      
7 12,000,000$    1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      1,200,000$      
8 12,171,429$    1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      1,217,143$      
9 12,342,857$    1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      1,234,286$      
10 12,514,286$    1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      1,251,429$      
11 12,685,714$    1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      1,268,571$      
12 12,857,143$    1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      1,285,714$      
13 13,028,571$    1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      1,302,857$      







Figure 7.   CPFF Fee-Payout Table 
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Contrary to a Cost-Plus Fixed Fee contract, a contract negotiated using the TRIM 
penalizes a contractor for trying to buy-in.  Refer back to Figure 6 for the following 
example.  If the contractor proposed a target cost of $12M (A6) even though the 
contractor expects the effort to actually cost $13M (Column M), the contractor would pay 
a share of the over-run costs and the fee earned would be $.891M (M6).  If the contractor 
told the truth and proposed his true estimated cost of $13M (A12), they would earn a 
profit of $.935M (M12). 
CPIF contracts and properly awarded CPAF contracts combat the tactic of 
buying-in in the same manner as the TRIM.  CPAF contracts have the opportunity to 
reduce the likelihood of buying-in if cost control is part of the award fee criteria and the 
award fee is properly administered.  Both CPIF and TRIM-based contracts have 
incentives based on a formula that relates target cost to actual cost.  Both CPIF and 
TRIM-based contracts penalize contractors when actual costs exceed target costs and 
both reward contractors when actual costs are below target costs.  This common incentive 
motivates contractors to work efficiently and reduce costs.  Since the incentives are based 
on a relationship between target cost and actual cost, it would be detrimental to a 
contractor to propose a target price that’s lower than the expected actual price. 
Though CPIF, properly administered CPAF, and TRIM-based contracts have 
much in common, an important difference is that CPIF and CPAF contracts incentivize 
contractors to negotiate higher target costs, where TRIM-based contracts incentivize 
contractors to negotiate the true expected target cost. 
To illustrate the difference between the CPIF and the TRIM-based contract, the 
same scenario is used from the previous CPFF example, a contractor building video 
sensors for the Predator UAV.  In this example, however, a CPIF contract is used instead 
of a CPFF contract.  The contractor estimates the development work will cost $12M and 
believes they will negotiate a reasonable fixed fee of 10%.  The Government has 
established an under-run share ratio of 80/20 (Government/Contractor) and an over-run 




A B C D E F G H I J K L M
Target Cost 11,142,857$  11,314,286$  11,485,714$ 11,657,143$ 11,828,571$ 12,000,000$ 12,171,429$ 12,342,857$ 12,514,286$ 12,685,714$ 12,857,143$ 13,028,571$ 
1 11,142,857$  1,114,286$    1,045,714$    977,143$       908,571$       840,000$       771,429$       702,857$       634,286$       565,714$       497,143$       428,571$       360,000$       
2 11,314,286$  1,165,714$    1,131,429$    1,062,857$    994,286$       925,714$       857,143$       788,571$       720,000$       651,429$       582,857$       514,286$       445,714$       
3 11,485,714$  1,217,143$    1,182,857$    1,148,571$    1,080,000$    1,011,429$    942,857$       874,286$       805,714$       737,143$       668,571$       600,000$       531,429$       
4 11,657,143$  1,268,571$    1,234,286$    1,200,000$    1,165,714$    1,097,143$    1,028,571$    960,000$       891,429$       822,857$       754,286$       685,714$       617,143$       
5 11,828,571$  1,320,000$    1,285,714$    1,251,429$    1,217,143$    1,182,857$    1,114,286$    1,045,714$    977,143$       908,571$       840,000$       771,429$       702,857$       
6 12,000,000$  1,371,429$    1,337,143$    1,302,857$    1,268,571$    1,234,286$    1,200,000$    1,131,429$    1,062,857$    994,286$       925,714$       857,143$       788,571$       
7 12,171,429$  1,422,857$    1,388,571$    1,354,286$    1,320,000$    1,285,714$    1,251,429$    1,217,143$    1,148,571$    1,080,000$    1,011,429$    942,857$       874,286$       
8 12,342,857$  1,474,286$    1,440,000$    1,405,714$    1,371,429$    1,337,143$    1,302,857$    1,268,571$    1,234,286$    1,165,714$    1,097,143$    1,028,571$    960,000$       
9 12,514,286$  1,525,714$    1,491,429$    1,457,143$    1,422,857$    1,388,571$    1,354,286$    1,320,000$    1,285,714$    1,251,429$    1,182,857$    1,114,286$    1,045,714$    
10 12,685,714$  1,577,143$    1,542,857$    1,508,571$    1,474,286$    1,440,000$    1,405,714$    1,371,429$    1,337,143$    1,302,857$    1,268,571$    1,200,000$    1,131,429$    
11 12,857,143$  1,628,571$    1,594,286$    1,560,000$    1,525,714$    1,491,429$    1,457,143$    1,422,857$    1,388,571$    1,354,286$    1,320,000$    1,285,714$    1,217,143$    
12 13,028,571$  1,680,000$    1,645,714$    1,611,429$    1,577,143$    1,542,857$    1,508,571$    1,474,286$    1,440,000$    1,405,714$    1,371,429$    1,337,143$    1,302,857$    







Figure 8.   CPIF Payout Table 
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Figure 8 is a payout table that shows how contractors are incentivized to 
maximize the target cost on a CPIF contract.  The contractor is incentivized to work 
efficiently to decrease actual costs (move left across the columns).  However, a contractor 
is also incentivized to inflate target costs (move down the rows).  For example, a 
contractor expects the actual cost to be $12M (A6).  According to the pay-out table, a 
standard CPIF contract encourages the contractor to inflate their target cost as high as 
possible (Row 12, highlighted in orange) in order to maximize fee. 
4. Reducing Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard occurs in the contract administration phase when contractors act in 
their own interest at the expense of the Government because it is costly or impossible for 
the Government to monitor them.  CPFF and poorly administered CPAF contracts are 
highly susceptible to moral hazard because fees are paid in full regardless of 
performance.  This scenario leaves the Government open to a moral hazard in which the 
contractor uses their “B-Team” or less efficient employees to work on the contract with a 
guaranteed fee, while saving their more efficient workers for contracts that incentivize 
efficient work and minimized costs.  Fees paid regardless of performance also provide 
contractors no incentive to reduce costs and spend tax payer dollars wisely. 
The Government’s standard approach to combating moral hazard, and countering 
any post-award opportunism, relies on external controls.  The Government buys 
adherence to their interests through oversight and insight—financial reports, program 
status reports and active monitoring by DCMA reps and program office managers.  
External monitoring is costly and resource intensive and provides the Government a 
retrospective view of costs incurred.  Internal controls, in the form of contract incentives 
that align Government and contractor objectives, are a more cost effective way to ensure 
contractors act in the Government’s best interest. 
CPIF, properly administered CPAF, and TRIM contracts all incentivize 




 mechanism.  For example, using inefficient workers or careless contract performance 
could lead to schedule delays and resulting cost overruns that are penalized under the 
TRIM-based contract. 
E. WHAT OTHER BENEFITS DOES TRIM OFFER? 
In addition to minimizing principal-agent problems, the TRIM offers many other 
benefits.  The following section explains how the TRIM helps generate more accurate 
cost estimates and may decrease bargaining/negotiating, information, policing, and 
enforcement costs. 
1. More Accurate Cost Estimates 
Because the TRIM is truth revealing, the Government has better insight into the 
true costs of projects, or at least what the contractor believes to be their true costs.  In 
CPFF and some CPAF contracts, contractors may be incentivized to buy-in if expected 
costs exceed the budget available, knowing that their agreed upon target cost will be less 
than the actual contract cost.  Alternatively, contractors may be incentivized to overstate 
costs, if the available budget allows, to increase their award fee pool.  The TRIM helps 
the Government ascertain accurate cost estimates up front and saves either the time 
and/or money it takes to repeatedly return to the financial coffers for additional funding 
or the excessive costs of an overstated cost target. 
2. Bargaining/Negotiating Costs 
The output of the TRIM is a contract menu from which a contractor chooses; the 
contractor picks his own contract.  Incentives are configured so the contractor earns a 
higher fee if they reveal the truth.  With Government and contractor objectives aligned, 
the scenario becomes win-win and there is no need for long, drawn out negotiations.  
Negotiations using the TRIM are short and save time. 
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3. Information Costs 
The TRIM helps minimize information asymmetry during contract negotiation by 
aligning principal and agent objectives.  With misaligned objectives, where the contractor 
is incentivized to misstate their proposed costs, the Government must acquire information 
to reveal true costs.  Acquiring cost and pricing information from contractors is costly.  
The TRIM helps minimize the Government need to gather information about a company 
prior to contract award. 
4. Policing and Enforcement Costs 
Detecting post-contractual opportunism during the administration of a contract is 
costly.  The Government must use resources such as Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA) to ensure contractors are working efficiently.  As stated previously in 
the discussion of moral hazards found in CPFF and CPAF contracts—contractors are 
incentivized to use their “B-Team” when “A-Team” players were negotiated.  The TRIM 
incentives are configured so the contractor is rewarded for putting their best people on the 
job and working as efficiently as possible. 
The many benefits listed above explain why the TRIM should be applied to DoD 
contracts.  The next chapter discusses where the TRIM can be applied in the DoD 
contracting environment.  Chapter V also explains how the Gates mechanism, the 
precursor to the TRIM, was modified to fit the boundaries of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations.  The explanation provides the reader a better understanding of where the 
TRIM can be used in real-world environments. 
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V. APPLICATIONS TO DOD CONTRACTING AND 
EVOLUTION OF THE TRIM 
The authors found value in the initial mechanism’s concept and determined the 
purported benefits could not go uninvestigated.  Knowing a contractor’s true cost helps 
level the playing field when negotiating contracts.  The TRIM is a tool that moves the 
Government closer to this ideal environment.  This chapter explains:  where the TRIM 
can be applied in DoD contracts, how and why the original mechanism was modified to 
fit within the guidelines of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and observations about 
the mechanism’s responses to repeated simulations. 
A. WHERE THE TRIM CAN BE APPLIED TO DOD CONTRACTING 
The TRIM can be used in negotiating all cost-plus-award fee/incentive fee 
(CPAF/IF) contracts regardless of whether or not competition exists.  The premise 
remains the same.  Using the TRIM combats principal-agent problems by aligning both 
contractor and Government objectives. 
1. The Competitive Environment 
Development and design work performed for the Government is usually procured 
using a cost-reimbursable type contract due to uncertainty in estimating the effort 
necessary to fulfill the requirement.  Cost-reimbursement contracts are appropriate when 
uncertainties involved in contract performance preclude estimating costs with sufficient 
accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract.20  The TRIM reduces principal-agent 
problems in a competitive environment.  However, in its current state, the TRIM only 
incentivizes contractors to reveal their true costs in a sole-source environment. 
                                                 
20  Federal Acquisition Regulation. 
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2. Sole-source Environment 
Environments where competition is absent, otherwise described as a sole source 
environment, give the contractor leverage to obtain a higher price than if competition was 
present.  Specifically, it is in this type environment that the TRIM provides the greatest 
value and can best be applied.  When market forces are absent, the contractor has a more 
advantageous negotiating position and can command a premium for their service.  The 
TRIM offers a higher target fee when the contractor chooses a lower target cost, 
refraining contractors from selecting an inflated target cost. 
a. Proprietary Information 
Major weapon systems being acquired in today’s environment are very 
costly and technologically complex.  Most often the Government declines to purchase 
full data rights to weapons systems because it’s cost prohibitive.  In declining the data 
purchase, the Government must return to the original weapon system equipment 
manufacturer for future work specific to that weapon system. 
Modifications and upgrades to a weapon system are a staple in the 
warfighter’s diet.  Weapon systems are continually being modified today to outfit them 
with the latest and greatest capabilities.  Due to proprietary data the contractor holds, the 
Government succumbs to submitting a justification and approval to negotiate and 
contract with the source holding the proprietary information.  In these situations the 
contractor knows they are the best value choice to accomplish the Government 
requirement and can use this favored position to their advantage.  Again, the TRIM 
incentivizes the contractor to select their true estimated cost instead of an inflated target 
cost. 
b. Previously Competed Contracts 
To reduce procurement lead time, acquisition professionals often award 
new requirements on previously competed contracts to a sole-source.  This contract 
vehicle eliminates the time intensive effort of competing a requirement.  The approval 
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process for going sole source is eliminated.  The contracting officer simply adds a new 
requirement, usually in the form of a task or delivery order, to the master contract.  This 
practice reduces the time between receiving the requirement and when the contractor 
starts work.  Obviously, this is highly preferred by both acquisition personnel, for the 
work eliminated, and by the warfighter for the decreased time in fielding the needed 
capability. 
Using pre-negotiated contracts, however, comes with consequences.  
Competition is eliminated as the request for proposal goes only to the company executing 
under the previously competed contract.  Price negotiation between the Government and 
contractor still occurs, but the “previously competed/sole source contract” provides the 
contractor an advantaged negotiating position to maximize profit. 
B. MODIFICATIONS TO THE TRIM 
Modifications were made to the initial truth revealing mechanism to adapt its 
applicability to Government contracting.  The initial mechanism evolved into the TRIM 
by incorporating FAR mandated policies, financial and program management concerns. 
1. Initial Mechanism Modifications 
The mechanism was modified to incorporate important factors necessary for its 
use in the DoD contracting environment.  These factors include budget considerations, 
FAR policy guidelines, target cost development, and subjectivity.  Adding these factors 
enhances the mechanism’s value and makes the mechanism easier for contracting officer 
to use while remaining mathematically sound. 
2. Budget Considerations 
The initial mechanism failed to account for budget considerations.  A budget 
constraint was added to the original mechanism to alert a contracting officer when there 




constructed; the award amount can not exceed the budgeted/authorized amount.  
Exceeding the authorized budget in awarding a contract is a violation of the Anti-
deficiency Act. 
3. Use of a Structured Approach for Estimating Profit Percentage 
The initial mechanism created a fee range based on the economic concept of 
individual rationality.  The minimum fee was determined to be the minimum fee the 
contractor would willingly accept to enter into a contract.  The maximum fee had no 
upper bounds since it was based on a percentage of cost savings.  The mechanism’s 
potential fee range needed to be modified because it is very difficult for a Government 
contracting officer to determine a contractor’s individuality rationality.  The initial 
mechanism also didn’t consider DFAR guidelines in determining a fair and reasonable 
fee.  DFAR 215.404-4 mandates that negotiated cost reimbursement contracts use a 
structured approach to create a fee value that accounts for appropriate risk to the 
contractor given the work proposed.21  In developing the TRIM, the weighted guidelines 
method was chosen to make a value determination of potential fee.  Using the weighted 
guidelines, DoD Form 1547, should facilitate a correct fee calculation.  Historical profits 
for projects similar in complexity and size should be used to determine the entries to the 
DoD Form 1547.  The resulting fee becomes the center of the target fee range as it 
complements the Government’s target cost figure. 
4. Development of the Target Cost 
To create the proper target cost, the initial mechanism accounted for an 
Independent Government Estimate (IGE) and the lone contractor’s offer.  Modifications 
to improve target cost fidelity involved including not only the IGE and the contractor’s  
offer but also any competing offers by other contractors, market research, history of 
similar or near similar efforts, and the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)  
 
                                                 
21  DoD Supplement to Federal Acquisition Regulations. Current Through DCN 20071108, November 
2007. 
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estimates when entering milestone B or C.  The more estimates, whether point or range, 
the better chance of presenting a range of cost targets that encompass the contractor’s 
estimated true cost. 
5. Necessary Addition of Subjectivity 
The initial contracting mechanism was purely objective because the mechanism 
focused solely on cost.  This caused the contractor to elevate cost to the most important 
factor when making program decisions, regardless of Government priority.  To adapt the 
mechanism for use in CPAF contracts, the total potential fee pool must be divided into 
amounts that address both objective and subjective evaluations.  Using a CPAF contract 
recognizes the importance of retaining control over areas other than cost deemed 
important, such as management responsiveness, schedule, quality, and technical 
performance. 
Focusing solely on cost reduces the Government program manager’s ability to 
subjectively evaluate the contractor and control aspects of the program other than cost.  
An amount of subjectivity is needed to maintain and foster the Government-contractor 
relationship. 
C. TRIM OBSERVATIONS 
1. Constrained Budget and Insufficient Funds 
TRIM explores budget realism by including budget data specific to a potential 
contract.  This data provides a means to alert contracting officers, program managers, and 
financial personnel to budget concerns.  When the TRIM parameters result in a total 
contract cost for the more expensive cost targets that exceed the total budget, TRIM 
includes a cell that shows “Budget Constrained”.  Under a constrained budget, the upper 
bound of the target cost range is adjusted to the constrained budget and does not include 




costs above and below the expected target cost loose their symmetry in this case.  See 
Figure 9.  While the incentive to reveal true cost remains, the incentive (risk) to the 
contractor is reduced. 
 
CONTRACT MENU INPUTS
Cap 36,049.18$          
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 10.00% 31,500$              0.500 5,644$         37,144$         17.9%
Target Fee 12% 32,000$              0.475 5,400$         37,400$         16.9%
Max Share Ratio 0.5 32,500$              0.450 5,169$         37,669$         15.9%
Min Share Ratio 0.15 33,000$              0.425 4,950$         37,950$         15.0%
33,500$              0.400 4,744$         38,244$         14.2%
34,000$              0.375 4,550$         38,550$         13.4%
Less than the 10% 34,500$              0.350 4,369$         38,869$         12.7%
input as range 35,000$              0.325 4,200$         39,200$         12.0%
35,150$              0.300 4,153$         39,303$         11.8%
35,300$              0.275 4,110$         39,410$         11.6%
35,450$              0.250 4,071$         39,520$         11.5%
Smaller $ intervals 35,600$              0.225 4,035$         39,635$         11.3%
35,749$              0.200 4,003$         39,753$         11.2%
35,899$              0.175 3,975$         39,874$         11.1%
36,049$              0.150 3,951$         40,000$         11.0%
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Figure 9.   Budget Constrained TRIM 
 
While the effectiveness of the TRIM is not reduced, the Government budget 
boundaries clearly limit the contract option choices available to the contractor and 
weaken the incentives for truth revelation.  The option desired by the contractor whose 
expected costs exceed the target cost may not be available if budget constrained.  The 
notification of “Budget Constrained” reveals a restricted Government position in offering 
contract options with a higher target if their expected costs exceed the total budget.  The 
Government’s financial boundaries are binding when a budget constrained situation 
occurs. 
Entering a target cost amount close in value to your budget constraint activates a 
cell to show “Insufficient Funds.”  This causes your target cost values to descend on not 
just one side of the target cost, as normal, but both.  See Figure 10.  This indicator alerts 
the contracting officer that awarding this contract near or above the expected target cost 
is not possible given the appropriated budget.  The contracting officer should relay this 
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information to the program manager for consideration.  Two results may come about:  
increase the budget by adding additional funds or re-scope the requirement. 
CONTRACT MENU INPUTS
Cap 34,408.20$          
Target Cost 38,500.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 10.00% 34,650$              0.500 6,208$         40,858$         17.9%
Target Fee 12% 35,200$              0.475 5,940$         41,140$         16.9%
Max Share Ratio 0.5 35,750$              0.450 5,686$         41,436$         15.9%
Min Share Ratio 0.15 36,300$              0.425 5,445$         41,745$         15.0%
36,850$              0.400 5,218$         42,068$         14.2%
37,400$              0.375 5,005$         42,405$         13.4%
37,950$              0.350 4,806$         42,756$         12.7%
38,500$              0.325 4,620$         43,120$         12.0%
37,915$              0.300 4,803$         42,718$         12.7%
37,331$              0.275 4,971$         42,302$         13.3%
36,746$              0.250 5,124$         41,871$         13.9%
Non-normal 36,162$              0.225 5,263$         41,425$         14.6%
descending amounts 35,577$              0.200 5,387$         40,964$         15.1%
34,993$              0.175 5,497$         40,490$         15.7%
34,408$              0.150 5,592$         40,000$         16.3%
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Figure 10.   TRIM Showing Insufficient Funds 
 
2. Negative Fees 
Using an unconstrained budget, a large target range around the target cost can 
cause the target fee to become negative at the higher end of the target cost range.  A 
negative fee provides an important signal to the contracting officer inputting the data.  
Considering that the TRIM is a truth revealing mechanism, contractors would only select 
these higher cost targets if they reflected their expected actual costs.  Furthermore, the 
contractor would balk at entering into a contractual agreement that starts with a negative 
fee for expected actual costs.  This indicates that the share ratio amounts or award fee 
pool are not appropriate for the amount of risk involved (the potential range of actual 
expected costs).  See Figure 11. 
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CONTRACT MENU INPUTS
Cap 46,416.67$          
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 30.00% 24,500$              0.700 9,450$         33,950$         38.6%
Target Fee 9% 26,000$              0.671 8,421$         34,421$         32.4%
Max Share Ratio 0.7 27,500$              0.643 7,436$         34,936$         27.0%
Min Share Ratio 0.3 29,000$              0.614 6,493$         35,493$         22.4%
 30,500$              0.586 5,593$         36,093$         18.3%
Share ratios not 32,000$              0.557 4,736$         36,736$         14.8%
reflective of huge 33,500$              0.529 3,921$         37,421$         11.7%
cost range 35,000$              0.500 3,150$         38,150$         9.0%
36,500$              0.471 2,421$         38,921$         6.6%
38,000$              0.443 1,736$         39,736$         4.6%
39,500$              0.414 1,093$         40,593$         2.8%
41,000$              0.386 493$            41,493$         1.2%
42,500$              0.357 (64)$             Negative Fee 42,436$         -0.2%
44,000$              0.329 (579)$           not an error 43,421$         -1.3%
45,500$              0.300 (1,050)$        44,450$         -2.3%
Budget 45,000.00$          
Share Ratio
-                                                    
 
Contract Menu
Fee % of  
Target CostTarget Cost Target Fee Cost Total
 
Figure 11.   TRIM Showing Negative Fee 
 
Now that you have a better idea of how the TRIM was derived and where it 
applies, the next logical step is implementation.  The following chapter provides the 
authors conclusion and recommendations on how the TRIM should be simultaneously 
implemented by DoD in the cost-reimbursement, sole-source environment while being 
further researched by Naval Postgraduate School academia to expand the TRIM’s 
usefulness across other contract environments. 
 45
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Principal-agent relationship problems exist in all contractual relationships—
especially cost reimbursement contracts.  Contractor opportunism such as: artificially 
inflating target costs when market forces are absent, buying-in to win a contract award 
and using the “B-Team” to execute a contract are strategic behaviors that contractors 
often employ to further their objectives at the Government’s expense.  These types of 
principal agent problems contribute to the cost over-runs that plague so many DoD 
procurements.  The authors of this research paper found value in the Gates mechanism 
that addressed these types of principal agent problems.  The mechanism, although useful 
in theory, did not fit into the boundaries of the DoD contracting environment.  The 
authors endeavored to create a bridge from theory to application.  This research paper 
described that journey. 
Given additional time for exploration and implementation of the TRIM concept, 
the authors recommend the following actions to provide additional insight into TRIM’s 
applicability to Government Contracting.  These recommendations should aid in the 
TRIM’s transition from theory to application: 
A. TEST AND IMPLEMENT THE MECHANISM 
First, suggest that Naval Postgraduate School faculty members from the economic 
and contracting disciplines perform a beta test of the mechanism in a mock negotiation 
situation.  Upon completing this mock negotiation, identifying the resulting lessons 
learned, and implementing any modifications necessary; a test of the mechanism on a low 
dollar value, short period of performance negotiated procurement would reveal valuable 
data.  Using the current proposed TRIM is a viable option that meets FAR policy 
guidelines for handling negotiated procurements in a sole-source environment. 
Second, upon successful beta test, the TRIM mechanism and user’s guide should 
be distributed to the Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting (SAF/AQC) 
and service equivalents, for review and implementation. Suggest that SAF/AQC assign 
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responsibility to test the TRIM on a relatively low-risk, sole-source, cost-reimbursement 
contract.  That contracting office should report back to SAF/AQC on the effectiveness of 
the TRIM in negotiations and contract administration. 
B. CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH ON HOW THE TRIM CAN BE 
APPLIED IN COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS TO ALL OFFERERS IN 
THE COMPETITIVE RANGE 
The authors propose two recommendations for applying the TRIM within the 
competitive environment.  One, it is imperative to investigate how to fairly and equitably 
use the TRIM with all offerors in the competitive range.  The initial mechanism was 
constructed to be used with the winning contractor selected from contractors in the 
competitive range.  Arguably, this approach is contrary to what is practiced today and 
mandated by the FAR.  Additionally, consideration must be given to identifying the 
intent to use the TRIM in the solicitation. 
Two, recommend further research into modifying the TRIM to better combat 
against the problem of buy-in.  In its current state, the TRIM only addresses one type of 
buy-in.  Even when the TRIM addresses buy-in, it does not force the contractor to reveal 
the truth.  Obtaining a contractor’s true cost will aid the government in controlling costs. 
The authors suggest limiting the TRIM implementation to only a sole-source 
environment until the TRIM can be further tested and the affects on contractors operating 
in a competitive environment are understood. 
C. CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH ON HOW CONTRACTOR RISK 
AVERSION AFFECTS THE TRIM 
Further study into quantifying contractor risk aversion and its affect on the TRIM 
mechanism construction should be investigated.  Methods of determining risk aversion 
would be beneficial as no two contractors are equally risk averse.  Risk aversion may also 
alter the share ratio as less risk adverse contractors may desire higher ratios. 
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D. CONDUCT FURTHER RESEARCH ON INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY 
OR THE LOWEST FEE REQUIRED FOR A CONTRACTOR TO SELECT 
ONE OF THE TRIM CONTRACT OPTIONS 
Different contractors require different returns on investment.  In using the TRIM 
to negotiate with different contractors across different contracts, individual rationality 
differs for each and therefore the mechanism must also differ.  Comprehensive market 
research into who can fulfill the requirement as well as their current business position 
should help determine the individual rationality for each. 
In summary, it is the authors’ contention that the TRIM can be used successfully 
to reduce the rampant cost-overrun problems seen in DoD acquisitions.  The TRIM 
addresses principal-agent problems more effectively than any other cost-reimbursement 
contract type currently used by the DoD.  Although in its infancy, the TRIM is ready to 
be used to negotiate and administrate CPAF/IF contracts in a sole-source environment.  
SAF/AQC and other service equivalents should consider implementing the TRIM.  The 
Naval Postgraduate School academia should conduct further research to bolster the 
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APPENDIX: THE TRIM USER’S GUIDE 
A. PURPOSE 
The purposes of this user’s guide is to introduce Government contracting 
professionals to the Truth Revealing Incentive Mechanism (TRIM) and explain how the 
TRIM can be used in the negotiation and administration of cost plus award fee/incentive 
fee (CPAF/IF) contracts. 
The TRIM is an economic mechanism, based on principal-agent relationships, 
that uses incentives to align contractors’ interests with those of the Government.  The 
TRIM was designed for cost reimbursement contracts.  Specifically, the TRIM is 
intended to be used on CPAF/IF contracts.  The mechanism is called “truth revealing” 
because it structures incentives so the contractor will select a contract option that most 
closely reflects their expected cost.  In other words, the incentive structure ensures the 
contractor maximizes expected fees by choosing a low cost target if expected costs are 
low, and by choosing a high cost target if expected costs are high. 
The user’s guide is broken down into three sections.  The first section gives a 
step-by-step explanation on how to use the TRIM.  The second provides a fee pay-out 
table to explain how the TRIM incentivizes contractors to reveal their true costs.  The 
third explains how to administer the fee on a CPAF/IF contract using the TRIM. 
B. HOW THE TRIM INCENTIVIZES CONTRACTORS TO REVEAL TRUE 
COST DURING NEGOTIATIONS 
Simply put, the TRIM generates a variety of contract options from which a 
contractor can choose.  The options provided by the TRIM read like a restaurant menu.  
Each option on the menu has three components listed in the columns: target cost, share 
ratio, and target fee.  Each row on the menu is an contract option available to the 




one row, and a share ratio or target fee from another.  Figure 12 is an example of a 
contract menu established by the TRIM.  The highlighted row signifies one of the many 
options available. 
 
4,050,000$         0.600 759,375$     
4,114,286$         0.568 721,837$     
4,178,571$         0.536 686,365$     
4,242,857$         0.504 652,959$     
4,307,143$         0.471 621,620$     
4,371,429$         0.439 592,347$     
4,435,714$         0.407 565,140$     
4,500,000$         0.375 540,000$     
4,564,286$         0.343 516,926$     
4,628,571$         0.311 495,918$     
4,692,857$         0.279 476,977$     
4,757,143$         0.246 460,102$     
4,821,429$         0.214 445,293$     
4,885,714$         0.182 432,551$     
4,950,000$         0.150 421,875$     
Share Ratio
Contract Menu
Target Cost Target Fee
 
 
Figure 12.   TRIM-based Contract Menu 
 
Incentives are structured so the contractor has the potential to earn the highest fee 
if he/she chooses the contract closest to their expected costs.  The TRIM is truth revealing 
because of the relationship set-up between the target cost, share ratio, and the target fee.  
As the cost target increases, the sharing ratio and the target fee decrease. 
Here are a few examples of how the TRIM helps reveal the truth from a 
contractor trying to “game” the system.  Many cost-reimbursement contracts establish 
their target fee as a percentage of target cost.  By establishing target fee as a percentage 
of cost, a contractor is incentivized to inflate target costs as high as possible to gain a 
larger target fee and reduce risk.  This type of gamesmanship is common in sole source 
environments where competitive market forces are absent.  The TRIM combats this 
strategy by structuring incentives so choosing a higher target cost leads to a lower target 
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fee.  The TRIM also decreases the contractor share ratio as target costs increase so that 
the under-run incentive becomes less enticing. 
Another example of contractors trying to game the system is when a contractor 
“buys in” to increase their chance of winning a contract.  A contractor buys in on a 
contract when they propose a target cost lower than their estimated true cost.  At first 
glance, Figure X gives the impression that it’s lucrative for a contractor to buy-in—the 
target fee increases as the target cost decreases.  However, in this case, it is the share ratio 
function of the mechanism that incentivizes the contractor to reveal true cost.  The lower 
the target cost, the higher the share ratio.  A higher share ratio creates a stronger incentive 
for not exceeding target cost.  As a result of buying-in, the contractor is bound by the 
chosen option’s share ratio that decreases target fee at a rate faster than the contractor’s 
estimated true cost option not chosen.  Again, through the use of the TRIM, the 
contractor is incentivized to reveal their true costs for potential of receiving the highest 
fee. 
The remainder of this chapter will give step-by-step instructions on entering 
inputs into the TRIM so a menu of contracts can be developed for the contractor. 
1. Target Cost  
The target cost is the first item to enter into the TRIM.  The target cost is 
synonymous with most-likely cost.  The Government should determine the most likely 
cost by taking the following cost estimates and information into consideration: market 
research data, historical cost data, the selected contractor’s proposed target cost, 
independent Government cost estimate, and the proposed target costs of other offerers in 
the competitive range. 
When considering the above mentioned cost estimates, it is important to make an 
“apples-to-apples” comparison by identifying the factors affecting comparability (scope, 
assumptions, terms and conditions, etc.), determining the affects of those factors, and 
adjusting each cost estimate taking these factors into consideration.  Cost data should 
already be normalized during the source selection, when comparing proposals in 
choosing the best-value contractor.  Using the normalized cost estimates, enter the 
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average target cost value into the target cost cell of the TRIM.  Figure 13, gives an 
example of $35,000 being entered as the target cost. 
 
TRUTH REVEALING NEGOTIATIONS MODEL
CONTRACTS MENU INPUTS
Cap #############
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
Target Fee 35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
Max Share Ratio 35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
Min Share Ratio 35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$             0.000 -$            35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
35,000$              0.000 -$             35,000$         0.0%
Budget #############
Share Ratio
-                                                    
 
Contract Menu
Fee % of  
Target CostTarget Cost Target Fee Cost Total
 
Figure 13.   Target Cost Input 
 
After entering the target cost into the TRIM, every target cost option available on 
the menu of contracts will be the same.  Don’t worry, this is normal.  All the target costs 
on the contract menu will be the same until the target cost range is entered.  Only the 
target cost value on the menu, highlighted in bold above, will remain the same. 
2. Target Cost Range 
Target cost range is the second input to enter into the TRIM.  Since the target cost 
estimate entered in step 1 is only a point estimate, it is likely there will be variation 
between the target cost and actual cost.  Consequently, a variance percentage must be 
entered into the TRIM to account for cost variability.  For example, if actual costs are 
suspected to fall somewhere within ±10% of the target cost, 10% should be entered into 
your target cost range (shaded red in Figure 14).  This changes the values in the target 
cost column of the contract menu allowing the selected contractor to choose a contract 
that falls within ±10% of the chosen target cost.  Figure 14 shows how the 10% cost 
target range affects target costs on the contracts menu. 
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TRUTH REVEALING NEGOTIATIONS MODEL
CONTRACTS MENU INPUTS
Cap #############    -10%
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 10.00% 31,500$              0.000 -$             31,500$         0.0%
Target Fee 32,000$              0.000 -$             32,000$         0.0%
Max Share Ratio 32,500$              0.000 -$             32,500$         0.0%
Min Share Ratio 33,000$              0.000 -$             33,000$         0.0%
33,500$              0.000 -$             33,500$         0.0%
34,000$              0.000 -$             34,000$         0.0%
34,500$              0.000 -$             34,500$         0.0%
35,000$             0.000 -$            35,000$         0.0%
35,500$              0.000 -$             35,500$         0.0%
36,000$              0.000 -$             36,000$         0.0%
36,500$              0.000 -$             36,500$         0.0%
37,000$              0.000 -$             37,000$         0.0%
37,500$              0.000 -$             37,500$         0.0%
38,000$              0.000 -$             38,000$         0.0%
38,500$              0.000 -$             38,500$         0.0%
Budget #############   +10%
Share Ratio
-                                                    
 
Contract Menu
Fee % of  
Target CostTarget Cost Target Fee Cost Total
 
Figure 14.   Target Cost Range Input 
 
The original target cost ($35,000) placed in the contract menu middle acts as an 
anchor.  The target cost options on the menu located above the original target cost 
decrease linearly until reaching 10% below the original target cost.  Similarly, the target 
cost options on the menu located below the original target cost increase linearly until 
reaching 10% above your original target cost. 
When determining the percentage to use for the target cost range, risk of current 
market conditions and performance risk of the contractor should be considered.  
Performance risks can include but are not limited to: type and complexity of item/service 
being purchased, contractor past performance in similar efforts, availability of historical 
data, urgency of the requirement, technical maturity of the system, and extent and nature 
of subcontracting.22 
3. Target Fee 
The third column in the contracts menu is target fee.  Target fee is the “potential” 
fee a contractor will earn if cost, schedule, and performance requirements are met at 
target cost.  Similar to how a single target cost was used to fill an entire menu of target 
                                                 
22  Contract Pricing Reference Guide. (Vol. 4). Retrieved October 15, 2007 from: 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpf/contract_pricing_reference_guides.html. 
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cost options in step 1, a single target fee value to determine an entire menu of target fee 
options for the contractor is used.  The single target fee value is a percentage of the target 
cost determined in step 1.  In determining a fair and reasonable target fee percentage, 
guidance from the Federal Acquisition Regulation was sought. 
The Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR 15.404-4 Profit)23 mandates each 
agency use a structured approach when determining profit or fee for negotiated 
acquisitions that require cost analysis.  The Department of Defense has their own 
structured approach, the weighted guidelines method, for determining fair and reasonable 
fee.  Instructions for using the weighted guidelines method can be found in the 
Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS 215.404-
70)24.  This DFARS instruction guides the user in how to fill out the DD Form 1574, 
Record of Weighted Guidelines Application.  Completing DD Form 1574 calculates a 
fair and reasonable fee percentage for entry into the TRIM (shaded red in Figure 15).  
Since the TRIM is used in CPAF contracts, weighted guidelines are not mandatory.  That 
given; the weighted guidelines should only be used as a starting point to find a fair and 
reasonable range for target fees.  Also consider investigating the range of fees used in 
past CPAF contracts for similar efforts. 
TRUTH REVEALING NEGOTIATIONS MODEL
CONTRACTS MENU INPUTS
Cap #############
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 10.00% 31,500$              0.000 4,200$         35,700$         13.3%
Target Fee 12% 32,000$              0.000 4,200$         36,200$         13.1%
Max Share Ratio 32,500$              0.000 4,200$         36,700$         12.9%
Min Share Ratio 33,000$              0.000 4,200$         37,200$         12.7%
33,500$              0.000 4,200$         37,700$         12.5%
34,000$              0.000 4,200$         38,200$         12.4%
34,500$              0.000 4,200$         38,700$         12.2%
35,000$             0.000 4,200$        39,200$         12.0%
35,500$              0.000 4,200$         39,700$         11.8%
36,000$              0.000 4,200$         40,200$         11.7%
36,500$              0.000 4,200$         40,700$         11.5%
37,000$              0.000 4,200$         41,200$         11.4%
37,500$              0.000 4,200$         41,700$         11.2%
38,000$              0.000 4,200$         42,200$         11.1%
38,500$              0.000 4,200$         42,700$         10.9%
Budget #############
Share Ratio
-                                                    
 
Contract Menu
Fee % of  
Target CostTarget Cost Target Fee Cost Total
Figure 15.   Target Fee Input 
                                                 
23  Federal Acquisition Regulations. 
24  DoD Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulations. 
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Once the target fee percentage has been entered, the TRIM automatically 
multiplies the target fee percentage by the target cost to determine the dollar value for the 
target fee.  In Figure 15, every target fee option available on the menu of contracts is the 
same.  Don’t worry, this is normal.  All target fee values on the contract menu will be the 
same until entry of the share ratios occurs in the next two steps.  The only target fee 
option remaining the same is the middle target fee value on the menu, highlighted in bold 
in Figure 15.  Once minimum and maximum share ratios are entered, it will calculate the 
fee options based on the original target fee input, target cost options, and share ratios. 
4. Maximum Share Ratio 
In the context of using the TRIM, sharing ratio is defined as the percentage of risk 
assumed by the contractor.  For example, if the sharing ratio is 60%, the contractor 
assumes 60% of the risk when the target cost deviates from the actual cost.  If the 
contractor performed well, causing the actual cost to be lower than the target cost—the 
contractor earns 60 cents of every dollar under the target cost.  Conversely, if the 
contractor performed poorly, causing actual cost to be higher than the target cost—60 
cents of every dollar over the chosen target cost is deducted from the target fee.  
Maximum share ratio should be determined by considering the upper limit of risk a 
prudent contractor would be willing to accept on this particular contract given current 
market conditions.  A point to consider, the closer the contractor’s share ratio approaches 
100%, the closer the contract mimics a firm fixed price arrangement.  Figure 16 shows 
how a maximum share ratio of 60% (highlighted in red) populates the share ratio column 
as well as alters the target fee column of the contract menu.  Until a minimum share ratio 
is entered, the TRIM assumes the minimum share ratio is zero and populates the share 
ratio column linearly from 60% down to a 0% share ratio. 
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TRUTH REVEALING NEGOTIATIONS MODEL
CONTRACTS MENU INPUTS
Cap #############
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 10.00% 31,500$              0.600 5,775$         37,275$         18.3%
Target Fee 12% 32,000$              0.557 5,486$         37,486$         17.1%
Max Share Ratio 0.6 32,500$              0.514 5,218$         37,718$         16.1%
Min Share Ratio 33,000$              0.471 4,971$         37,971$         15.1%
33,500$              0.429 4,746$         38,246$         14.2%
34,000$              0.386 4,543$         38,543$         13.4%
34,500$              0.343 4,361$         38,861$         12.6%
35,000$             0.300 4,200$        39,200$         12.0%
35,500$              0.257 4,061$         39,561$         11.4%
36,000$              0.214 3,943$         39,943$         11.0%
36,500$              0.171 3,846$         40,346$         10.5%
37,000$              0.129 3,771$         40,771$         10.2%
37,500$              0.086 3,718$         41,218$         9.9%
38,000$              0.043 3,686$         41,686$         9.7%
38,500$              0.000 3,675$         42,175$         9.5%
Budget #############
Share Ratio
-                                                    
 
Contract Menu
Fee % of  
Target CostTarget Cost Target Fee Cost Total
 
Figure 16.   Maximum Share Ratio Input 
 
5. Minimum Share Ratio 
In the context of using the TRIM, sharing ratio is defined as the percentage of risk 
assumed by the contractor.  For example, if the sharing ratio was 15%, the contractor 
assumes 15% of the risk the target cost will deviate from the actual cost of the contract.  
If the contractor performs well, resulting in an actual cost lower than the target cost—the 
contractor earns 15 cents of every dollar of the under-run.  Conversely, if the contractor 
performs poorly, causing the actual cost to be higher than the target cost—15 cents of 
every dollar over the chosen target cost is deducted from the target fee.  Since share ratio 
risk is shifted between the contractor and the Government, the minimum share ratio 
should consider the maximum amount of risk the Government is willing to accept on this 
particular contract given current market conditions.  For example, if the Government is 
willing to bear a maximum of 85% of the risk, the minimum contractor risk should be set 
at 15%.  Another point to consider, as the contractor’s share ratio approaches zero, the 
contract mimics a cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) arrangement.  Figure 17 shows how a 
maximum share ratio of 15% (highlighted in red) populates the share ratio column as well 
as alters the target fee column of the contract menu.  After the minimum share ratio is 
entered, the target fee column will adjust to the minimum share ratio. 
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TRUTH REVEALING NEGOTIATIONS MODEL
CONTRACTS MENU INPUTS
Cap #############
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 10.00% 31,500$              0.600 5,906$         37,406$         18.8%
Target Fee 12% 32,000$              0.568 5,614$         37,614$         17.5%
Max Share Ratio 0.6 32,500$              0.536 5,338$         37,838$         16.4%
Min Share Ratio 0.15 33,000$              0.504 5,079$         38,079$         15.4%
33,500$              0.471 4,835$         38,335$         14.4%
34,000$              0.439 4,607$         38,607$         13.6%
34,500$              0.407 4,396$         38,896$         12.7%
35,000$             0.375 4,200$        39,200$         12.0%
35,500$              0.343 4,021$         39,521$         11.3%
36,000$              0.311 3,857$         39,857$         10.7%
36,500$              0.279 3,710$         40,210$         10.2%
37,000$              0.246 3,579$         40,579$         9.7%
37,500$              0.214 3,463$         40,963$         9.2%
38,000$              0.182 3,364$         41,364$         8.9%
38,500$              0.150 3,281$         41,781$         8.5%
Budget #############
Share Ratio
-                                                    
 
Contract Menu
Fee % of  
Target CostTarget Cost Target Fee Cost Total
 
Figure 17.   Minimum Share Ratio Input 
 
6. Budget 
The final input into the TRIM is budget.  The budget is the dollar amount, 
authorized by Congress, to be expended on this particular procurement.  The budget 
should include both cost and fee.  Before entering the budget, please refer to Figure 18.  
In Figure 18, the budget cell is located in the bottom left corner, highlighted in red.  
Currently there is a large placeholder value in the budget cell.  The large placeholder 
ensures the contract menu is not constrained by the budget. 
TRUTH REVEALING NEGOTIATIONS MODEL
CONTRACTS MENU INPUTS
Cap #############
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 10.00% 31,500$              0.600 5,906$         37,406$         18.8%
Target Fee 12% 32,000$              0.568 5,614$         37,614$         17.5%
Max Share Ratio 0.6 32,500$              0.536 5,338$         37,838$         16.4%
Min Share Ratio 0.15 33,000$              0.504 5,079$         38,079$         15.4%
33,500$              0.471 4,835$         38,335$         14.4%
34,000$              0.439 4,607$         38,607$         13.6%
34,500$              0.407 4,396$         38,896$         12.7%
35,000$             0.375 4,200$        39,200$         12.0%
35,500$              0.343 4,021$         39,521$         11.3%
36,000$              0.311 3,857$         39,857$         10.7%
36,500$              0.279 3,710$         40,210$         10.2%
37,000$              0.246 3,579$         40,579$         9.7%
37,500$              0.214 3,463$         40,963$         9.2%
38,000$              0.182 3,364$         41,364$         8.9%










-                                                    
 
Contract Menu
Fee % of  
Target CostTarget Cost Target Fee Cost Total
 
 
Figure 18.   Budget Input and Budget Constraints.  
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There are also two important budget numbers in Figure 18, circled in red, in the 
cost total column.  The dollar values in the cost total column are the sum of the target 
cost and target fee in that particular row.  The first important budget number ($39200) 
represents the minimum budget required for the contract to have sufficient funds.  This 
dollar value is based on the most likely target cost estimate ($35,000) and the target fee 
established using a structured approach ($4,200).  If the appropriated funding is less than 
this value, there is not enough money to award a contract.  If a budget value less than this 
number is entered, the TRIM mechanism will not work, and an “insufficient funds” 
warning in cell F25 will result. 
The second number circled in the cost total column in Figure 18 ($41,781) 
represents the minimum budget needed for the TRIM to operate without constraints.  This 
number ($41,781) represents the budget needed to fully fund the contract to cover both 
the target cost at the highest point on the total cost range ($38,500), and the associated 
target fee ($3,281).  Any dollar value less than this number will constrain the TRIM’s 
ability to offer a contract option at the highest point on the total cost range (+10).  If the 
budget is low enough to constrain the TRIM, a “budget constrained” warning in cell F24 
will result.  Under a constrained budget, the upper bound of the target cost range is 
adjusted to the constrained budget and does not include the full target cost range that 
would be included without the budget constraint.  While the effectiveness of the TRIM is 
not reduced, the Government budget boundaries clearly limit the contract option choices 
available to the contractor and weaken the incentives for truth revelation.  The option 
desired by the contractor whose expected costs exceed the target cost may not be 
available if budget constrained.  The notification of “Budget Constrained” reveals a 
restricted Government position in offering contract options with a higher target if their 
expected costs exceed the total budget.  Simply put, the Government’s financial 
boundaries are binding when a Budget Constrained situation occurs. 
 59
C. UNDERSTANDING THE FEE PAYOUT TABLE: HOW THE TRIM 
INCENTIVIZES CONTRACTORS TO REVEAL THEIR TRUE COSTS 
1. Offering the Contract Menu to Contractors 
Once all inputs are entered into the TRIM, the contracts menu is ready for use in 
negotiations with the contractor.  Figure 19 is a snap shot of what the contract menu 
would look like given the input values in the previous section. 
Option
1 31,500$              0.600 5,906$         
2 32,000$              0.568 5,614$         
3 32,500$              0.536 5,338$         
4 33,000$              0.504 5,079$         
5 33,500$              0.471 4,835$         
6 34,000$              0.439 4,607$         
7 34,500$              0.407 4,396$         
8 35,000$             0.375 4,200$        
9 35,500$              0.343 4,021$         
10 36,000$              0.311 3,857$         
11 36,500$              0.279 3,710$         
12 37,000$              0.246 3,579$         
13 37,500$              0.214 3,463$         
14 38,000$              0.182 3,364$         
15 38,500$              0.150 3,281$         
Share Ratio
Contract Menu
Target Cost Target Fee
 
 
Figure 19.   TRIM-based Contract Menu #2 
 
There are several ways in which the contract menu can be used in negotiations 
with the contractor.  The easiest way to negotiate a contract price is to hand the contracts 
menu over and let the contractor choose a contract option. 
If uncomfortable with this unorthodox style of negotiation, choose not to show the 
contractor the contract menu.  Instead, start negotiations by proposing the target cost 
option on the menu.  If the contractor is satisfied with the target cost option, try to 
incentivize them by offering a larger target fee if they can lower their target cost.  For 
example, if the contractor proposes a target cost of $36,00, based on the contract menu in 
Figure X, offer contractor option # 10 ($36000, .311, $3857).  If the contractor agrees to 
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this price, continue to offer higher fee for a lower target cost (options #9, #8, #7, etc.) 
until the contractor no longer lowers their target cost. 
On the other hand, if the contractor rejects the original offer, propose another 
contract option more aligned with their desires.  For example, if the contractor proposes a 
target cost of $35000, based on the contract menu above in Figure X, respond with option 
#8 ($35,000, .375, $42,00).  If the contractor is unsatisfied with the counter offer because 
they want a larger target fee ($4,600 is ideal for the contractor), then offer the contractor 
option #6 from the contract menu. 
The negotiation should continue until the contract option that best aligns the 
Government’s desires (lower cost) with the contractors desires (higher fee) is found.  
Once again, it is important to remember that the contractor must choose across a row 
(i.e., they cannot choose the target cost from option #8, a share ratio from option #10, and 
a target fee from option #4.  The contract menu is only truth revealing when the 
contractor chooses options as they are listed, across the row. 
2. The Fee Payout Table 
The fee payout table is a tool to help understand why the TRIM is truth revealing.  
The fee payout table can be found on the second worksheet in the TRIM excel file, 
labeled “Fee Payout Table.”  Figure 20 is a snapshot of the fee payout table based on the 
example developed throughout the user’s guide. 
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D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S
Actual Cost
4 Target Cost 31,500$     32,000$     32,500$     33,000$    33,500$    34,000$    34,500$    35,000$    35,500$     36,000$    36,500$    37,000$    37,500$    38,000$    38,500$    
5 31,500$       5,906$       5,606$       5,306$       5,006$       4,706$       4,406$       4,106$       3,806$       3,506$       3,206$       2,906$       2,606$       2,306$       2,006$       1,706$       
6 32,000$       5,898$       5,614$       5,330$       5,046$       4,763$       4,479$       4,195$       3,911$       3,627$       3,343$       3,059$       2,775$       2,491$       2,207$       1,923$       
7 32,500$       5,874$       5,606$       5,338$       5,071$       4,803$       4,535$       4,267$       3,999$       3,731$       3,463$       3,196$       2,928$       2,660$       2,392$       2,124$       
8 33,000$       5,834$       5,582$       5,330$       5,079$       4,827$       4,575$       4,323$       4,071$       3,820$       3,568$       3,316$       3,064$       2,813$       2,561$       2,309$       
9 33,500$       5,778$       5,542$       5,306$       5,071$       4,835$       4,599$       4,363$       4,128$       3,892$       3,656$       3,421$       3,185$       2,949$       2,713$       2,478$       
10 34,000$       5,705$       5,486$       5,266$       5,046$       4,827$       4,607$       4,388$       4,168$       3,948$       3,729$       3,509$       3,289$       3,070$       2,850$       2,630$       
11 34,500$       5,617$       5,413$       5,210$       5,006$       4,803$       4,599$       4,396$       4,192$       3,988$       3,785$       3,581$       3,378$       3,174$       2,971$       2,767$       
12 35,000$       5,513$       5,325$       5,138$       4,950$       4,763$       4,575$       4,388$       4,200$       4,013$       3,825$       3,638$       3,450$       3,263$       3,075$       2,888$       
13 35,500$       5,392$       5,221$       5,049$       4,878$       4,706$       4,535$       4,363$       4,192$       4,021$       3,849$       3,678$       3,506$       3,335$       3,163$       2,992$       
14 36,000$       5,255$       5,100$       4,945$       4,789$       4,634$       4,479$       4,323$       4,168$       4,013$       3,857$       3,702$       3,546$       3,391$       3,236$       3,080$       
15 36,500$       5,103$       4,963$       4,824$       4,685$       4,546$       4,406$       4,267$       4,128$       3,988$       3,849$       3,710$       3,571$       3,431$       3,292$       3,153$       
16 37,000$       4,934$       4,811$       4,688$       4,564$       4,441$       4,318$       4,195$       4,071$       3,948$       3,825$       3,702$       3,579$       3,455$       3,332$       3,209$       
17 37,500$       4,749$       4,642$       4,535$       4,428$       4,321$       4,213$       4,106$       3,999$       3,892$       3,785$       3,678$       3,571$       3,463$       3,356$       3,249$       
18 38,000$       4,548$       4,457$       4,366$       4,275$       4,184$       4,093$       4,002$       3,911$       3,820$       3,729$       3,638$       3,546$       3,455$       3,364$       3,273$       
19 38,500$       4,331$       4,256$       4,181$       4,106$       4,031$       3,956$       3,881$       3,806$       3,731$       3,656$       3,581$       3,506$       3,431$       3,356$       3,281$        
 
Figure 20.   TRIM-based Fee Payout Table 
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In Figure 20, the letters (D-S) represent the columns and the numbers (4-19) 
represent the rows.  The letters and numbers will be used to identify specific cells in 
explaining this payout table.  The cells colored in blue represent the target cost options 
available on the contract menu.  The cells colored green represent the actual cost of the 
contract.  The cells in yellow and orange represent the potential fee available to the 
contractor.  The cells in orange highlight the highest potential fee a contractor can receive 
for a given actual cost. 
The target fee function is structured such that contractors have the potential to 
receive a higher fee if they choose a lower target cost.  This incentivizes the contractor to 
choose the lowest target cost possible, so long as their estimated actual costs are equal to 
or near the target cost.  However, if the contractor knows their estimated costs are lower 
than the target cost, the share ratios are structured so that contractors receive a lower fee 
by overstating the target cost and under-running the target than they would by simply 
accepting a lower cost target.  At the same time, the share ratio incentivizes the contractor 
to save costs wherever possible, once the target cost has been selected, to generate a 
larger fee from an under-run.  The mathematical relationship between the target fees, 
target costs, and share ratio ensure the additional fee gained from the under-run share 
ratio are lower than the increase in target fee from selecting a lower target cost.  
Reciprocally, the fee lost from sharing the cost of over-running the target are always 
more than the increased target fee from selecting a lower target cost. 
If a contractor can estimate with certainty that their true costs will be $34,000 
(column J).  The contractor earns the highest fee if they choose a target cost of $34,000 
(cell J10).  Cell J10 is highlighted in orange on the pay-out table because it is the highest 
fee the contractor can receive for an actual cost of $34,000.  If the contractor estimates 
that their true costs will be $34,000 but decides to choose a different target cost—the fee 
is not optimal.  For example, a contractor with expected costs of $34,000 acts 
strategically by choosing a higher target cost (e.g., $36,000) so they can earn additional 
fees from an under-run.  The fee received in this scenario ($ 4,479, Cell J14) is less than 
fee received if the contractor revealed their true cost ($4,607, Cell J10).  On the other 
hand, if the contractor with expected costs of $34,000 acts strategically by choosing a 
 63
lower target cost (e.g., $32,000) because the target fee is larger ($5,614), the over-run 
share ratio will deplete the target fee so it is less ($4,479, Cell J6) than the fee received if 
the contractor revealed their true cost ($4,607, Cell J10). 
D.  HOW TO ADMINISTER FEE ON A CPAF/IF CONTRACT THAT USES 
THE TRIM 
Before using the TRIM to administer fees during contract execution, it is 
important to understand the types of contracts that fit within the TRIM parameters.  The 
TRIM is designed for cost reimbursement contracts.  Specifically, the TRIM is intended 
for Cost-plus-award-fee/Cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPAF/IF) contracts.  The following 
section explains how to use the TRIM contract menu and payout table to calculate the fee 
awarded to the contractor during CPAF/IF contract performance. 
1. Determining the Target Fee 
The contractor selects their own target fee when they choose a contract option 
from the contract menu.  Once the contractor has chosen their target fee, it is time to use 
the TRIM to divide the target fee between an incentive fee and an award fee. 
2. Deriving the Award Fee and Incentive Fee from the Target Fee 
Once the contractor has chosen their target fee, the Government must determine 
how much target fee to assign as incentive fee and how much to assign as award fee.  The 
incentive fee is an objective formula that incentivizes the contractor to control costs.  The 
award fee is a subjective incentive that a contractor may earn in entirety or in part during 
contract performance.  The award fee portion of the target fee incentivizes the contractor 
for performance areas outside of cost including quality, schedule, and technical 
performance. 
It is the contracting officer’s job, in conjunction with the Government integrated 
product team (IPT) and stakeholders of the product/service being acquired, to determine 
how much of the target fee should be dedicated to controlling costs and how much should 
be dedicated to controlling areas other than cost.  Once the contracting officer knows 
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these percentages, the contracting officer should enter this information into the TRIM to 
determine the value of the incentive fee and award fee.  Figure 21 is a snapshot of both 
the TRIM contract menu and the administrative function that determines the incentive 
and award fee pools.  In this particular example, the contractor selected the contract menu 
option with a target fee of $4,607, circled in red, in the target fee column of the contracts 
menu.  The Government IPT believe cost control is important enough to warrant 40% of 
the overall target fee, so the contracting officer enters 40% into the incentive fee input 
cell and 60% into the award fee input cell.  The input cells are highlighted in red on the 
left hand side of Figure 21.  After incentive and award fee percentages are entered into 
the TRIM, it automatically determines the dollar values of both the incentive and award 
fee pools.  In this example, the potential incentive fee pool ($1,843) and the potential 
award fee pools ($2,764) are circled in red at the bottom of Figure 21. 
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TRUTH REVEALING NEGOTIATIONS MODEL
CONTRACTS MENU INPUTS
Cap #############
Target Cost 35,000.00$          
Target Cost Range (±%) 10.00% 31,500$              0.600 5,906$         37,406$         18.8%
Target Fee 12% 32,000$              0.568 5,614$         37,614$         17.5%
Max Share Ratio 0.6 32,500$              0.536 5,338$         37,838$         16.4%
Min Share Ratio 0.15 33,000$              0.504 5,079$         38,079$         15.4%
33,500$              0.471 4,835$         38,335$         14.4%
34,000$              0.439 4,607$         38,607$         13.6%
34,500$              0.407 4,396$         38,896$         12.7%
35,000$              0.375 4,200$         39,200$         12.0%
35,500$              0.343 4,021$         39,521$         11.3%
36,000$              0.311 3,857$         39,857$         10.7%
36,500$              0.279 3,710$         40,210$         10.2%
37,000$              0.246 3,579$         40,579$         9.7%
37,500$              0.214 3,463$         40,963$         9.2%
38,000$              0.182 3,364$         41,364$         8.9%
38,500$              0.150 3,281$         41,781$         8.5%
Budget #############
ADMINISTRATIVE Target Fee Target Target 
Incentive Fee % of Target Fee 40% 5,906$       2,363$         3,544$       
 Award Fee % of Target Fee  60% 5,614$      2,246$        3,369$      
5,338$       2,135$         3,203$       
5,079$       2,031$         3,047$       
4,835$       1,934$         2,901$       
4,607$       1,843$         2,764$       
4,396$       1,758$         2,637$       
4,200$       1,680$         2,520$       
4,021$       1,608$         2,412$       
3,857$       1,543$         2,314$       
3,710$       1,484$         2,226$       
3,579$       1,431$         2,147$       
3,463$       1,385$         2,078$       
3,364$      1,346$        2,019$      
3,281$      1,313$        1,969$      
Share Ratio
-                                                    
 
Contract Menu
Fee % of  
Target CostTarget Cost Target Fee Cost Total
 
Figure 21.   TRIM-based Administrative Function 
 
3. Administering the Incentive Fee 
After dividing the overall contract target fee into an incentive fee pool and an 
award fee pool—they must be kept separate.  The incentive fee pool and the award fee 
pool will be distributed at different times, in different manners. 
The incentive fee is based on how well the contractor’s target cost matches the 
contract’s actual costs.  If the contract’s actual cost is the same as the target cost, the 
contractor will receive the entire incentive fee.  Using Figure 21 as an example, the 
contractor would receive the entire $1843 if the target cost and the actual cost were both 
$34,000.  If the actual cost ended up lower than the target cost, the contractor would 
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receive the entire incentive pool plus a portion of every dollar that the actual cost was 
lower than the target cost.  The equation that represents the Incentive fee function is: 
F = I + S (T-A) 
Where:  
F = Actual incentive fee earned by the contractor 
I = Target Incentive Fee 
S = Share ratio 
T = Target cost 
A = Actual cost 
 
Using Figure 21 as an example, if the actual contract cost is $33,000 and the 
contractor’s target cost was $34,000, the contractor would earn the entire target incentive 
fee ($1,843) plus their share (.439) of the $1000 under-run ( $1,000 x .439 = $439).  This 
gives the contractor an actual incentive fee of $2,282. 
If the actual cost is greater than the target cost, the contractor’s actual incentive 
fee would be the target incentive fee minus the contractor’s share of the overrun (if A > T 
in the formula above, T – A < 0).  Using Figure 21 as an example, if the actual contract 
cost was $36,000 and the contractor’s target cost was $34,000—the contractor would 
earn the target incentive fee ($1,843) minus their share of the overrun ($2,000 x .439 = 
$878).  In this case, the contractor would earn an actual incentive fee of $965 ($1,843 -
$878 = $965). 
The problem with incentive fees is that you cannot determine actual costs until the 
end of the contract when the product/service has been delivered and the contract has been 
closed.  Waiting until contract closeout can be too long a wait for a contractor to receive 
fees.  Therefore, incentive fee payments should be made throughout the duration of the 
contract, based on estimations of how the contractor is controlling costs.  For example, 
the contractor should submit cost vouchers to recoup their actual costs of labor, materials, 
etc., throughout the duration of the cost-reimbursement contract.  The contracting officer 
should award incentive fees based on the percentage of costs.  For example, if the 
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contractor submits a cost voucher for 10% of the contract value, then 10% of the target 
incentive fee should be up for consideration.  The contracting officer should use earned 
value management data, specifically the cost performance index, to determine the portion 
of the accrued target incentive fee to award the contractor.  For example, a contractor has 
selected a contract from the TRIM contract menu with a target cost of $34,000, a share 
ratio of .439, and a target fee of $4,607.  Of that target fee, $1,843 is dedicated to the 
target incentive fee pool.  If the contractor submits a cost reimbursement voucher for 
10% of the contract value ($3,400), then 10% of the award fee pool should be considered 
for determination ($184).  If the current earned value management data states that the 
actual costs are aligned with the budgeted costs (the cost performance index is 1.00), then 
the contracting officer should award the full 10% of the target incentive fee pool ($184). 
Remember, these interim incentive fee payments awarded to the contractor are 
only estimates.  Once the contract is closed out and actual costs can be determined, the 
incentive fee awarded should be adjusted accordingly.  If the contractor’s incentive fee 
payments exceed what they have actually earned, the contractor will need to return the 
overpayment to the Government. 
4. Administering the Award Fee 
The award fee is a subjective incentive that a contractor may earn in its entirety or 
in part during contract performance.  The award fee portion of the overall target fee is 
intended to incentivize the contractor for performance areas outside of cost such as 
quality, schedule, and technical performance.  The contracting officer should work with 
all acquisition stakeholders to determine which areas of contractor performance, outside 
of cost control, need incentivizing. 
The step by step instructions on how to set-up an award fee plan is highly 
involved and outside the scope of this users guide.  Refer to your Government agencies’ 
instructions on award fee to determine how to properly set-up the award fee portion of 
the overall target fee.  If your agency does not have an award fee guide, our suggested 
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reference is the Department of the Air Force Award Fee Guide located in the AT&L 
Knowledge Sharing System of the Defense Acquisition University website25. 
5. The Crucial Relationship between the Incentive and Award Fees 
When Using the TRIM 
For the TRIM to create truth revealing incentives, the incentive fee pool and the 
award fee pool must be tied together.  The contractor’s share of a cost over-run can eat 
away both the cost incentive and award fee pool.  The TRIM mechanism is based on the 
total target fee and the contractor sharing ratio.  Even though we have divided the total 
fee into a cost incentive pool and an award fee pool to incentivized areas other than cost, 
the contractor share ratio is tied to the total target fee; if the cost over-run is large enough, 
it depletes both pools. 
The contract should be structured so any cost over-run is subtracted from the 
incentive fee portion of the total fee first.  If the cost over-run is so large that it eliminates 
the entire cost incentive fee, then the cost-overrun must be subtracted from the award fee 
pool.  On the other hand, if the contractor is under-running the contract, all additional 
fees are awarded as part of the incentive fee pool, not the award fee pool.  Adding the 
contractor under-run fees to the award fee pool would be unfair because the contractor 
would have to earn the cost savings fee twice. 
                                                 
25  Department of the Air Force Award Fee Guide. (2002).  Retrieved from October 05, 2007, from: 
https://akss.dau.mil/Lists/Guidebooks%20%20Handbooks/. 
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